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ABSTRACT
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is one of the most remarkable achievements in
the technology world. AI can be used dually by both civilians and combatants,
serving with both beneficial and harmful aims. In the military realm, by empowering
military systems to perform most warfare tasks without human involvement, AI
developments have changed the capacity of militaries to conduct complex
operations with heightened legal implications. Accordingly, it is vital to consider the
consequences emanating from its use in military operations. International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the laws of war, or the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC), is a set of rules which regulates armed conflict between States, as
well as civil wars. IHL protects people who are not involved or have ceased
participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of war. While
capabilities of new means of military AI continue to advance at incredible rates, on
an international level, IHL principles should be revisited to account for the new
reality in military operations. Additionally, on a national level, the impacts of
military AI developments on military power for international competition have
attracted the attention of national authorities. Therefore, studying both international
and national pathways will be necessary as the first step toward promoting
transparency in legal rules. Ultimately, central to my research is analyzing the
Canadian perspective on IHL and the military use of AI at both national and
international levels. Using a comparative approach with the American perspective,
I conclude that if Canada develops more cohesive policies on the new military use
of AI, it could become a legal leader in this realm.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
By imitating human intelligence, Artificial Intelligence enables machines and computer
systems to learn from, act, and perform tasks like a human. The definition of AI, as
proposed within the European Commission’s Communication on AI is as follows:
“Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems that display intelligent behaviour by
analysing their environment and taking actions – with some degree of autonomy –
to achieve specific goals…”1
AI technology is now being applied in various industries, including the military, with
a key role in current and future military applications. AI technologies promise to
revolutionize the face of warfare as new means and methods of warfare are increasingly
emerging. But the path to the future of technological advancements is not always clear as
AI technologies are rapidly evolving.
Implementing AI in military operations raises ethical and legal challenges. One of the
major challenges is that advances in AI technology are changing the capabilities of
weapons in modern warfare, reducing or eliminating the need for human oversight and
involvement. AI can perform most warfare tasks without any human involvement; AI could
empower fully military weapon systems in algorithmic warfare to carry out attacks, or to
take decisions independently without human involvement. By their nature, such weapons
cannot guarantee what will happen when encountering a new situation endangering non-

1

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Artificial Intelligence
for Europe, Brussels, 25.4.2018 COM (2018) 237 final. See also
Ed Burns, Nicole Laskowski & Linda Tucci, “What is artificial intelligence?” (TechTarget, 2021), online:
TechTarget https://searchenterpriseai.techtarget.com/definition/AI-Artificial-Intelligence:
“Artificial intelligence is the simulation of human intelligence processes by machines, especially computer
systems.”
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combatants. If artificial intelligence can perform any warfare task without human
involvement, humanitarian debates arise as to whether this technology can distinguish
between military and civilian targets or not.

2

Non-combatants are protected by

International Humanitarian Law (IHL, one branch of public international law), and therein
lies the challenge.
IHL is the legal framework applicable to situations of armed conflict governing the
conduct of hostilities. It governs relations between States aiming to limit the effects of
armed conflict 3 and the methods of warfare protecting those who are not or no longer
participating in an armed conflict or hostilities.4 IHL aims to reduce the suffering caused
by warfare, mitigate its consequences, protect victims of armed conflict, and preserve
human dignity in times of armed conflict. Accordingly, IHL deals with the humanitarian
aspects of a conflict, without considering the legality of using force in the first instance,
and is therefore known as jus in bello.5 Its regulations are the result of balancing between
military necessity and principles of humanity. According to IHL, to balance military
necessity with humanitarian requirements, the military's needs can never justify the use of
inhumane weapons. However, AI technology has substantially altered the nature of
weaponry and battle strategies, complicating compliance with IHL.

2

This is known as the distinction principle of International Humanitarian Law.
32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Report on International Humanitarian
Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 32IC/15/11 (Geneva, Switzerland, International
Committee
of
the
Red
Cross,
8-10
December
2015),
online:
<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armedconflicts>.
4
Defining the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities is another aim of
this body of law. See; International Committee of the Red Cross, War and International Humanitarian Law
(2010), online: www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm.
5
See for example International Committee of the Red Cross, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello (2020),
online: https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello
3

2

What I argue here is that if a rise in the militarization of AI becomes a highly
destabilizing development, it can unbalance international equilibrium6 which means more
competition among global powers to achieve military supremacy in AI. This technology,
by potentially empowering weapons systems in algorithmic warfare, may alter the behavior
of governments,7 leading to greater military competition.
These issues raise legal concerns for not only state decision-makers but also the future
of humankind. To help chart a course forward, I propose to review national and
international approaches, exploring grey areas that ought to be addressed. In particular, I
will explore Canadian approaches to IHL and military use of AI. Specifically, I ask, what
is the Canadian perspective on military uses of AI under IHL?
This question will be accompanied by the following sub-questions to discuss other
challenges resulting from the militarization of AI, and possible national and international
solutions:
1. Can Canada develop a transparent and IHL-compliant national AI military
strategy?
2. What solutions should be applied to fill gaps and clarify national AI strategies and
international legislation?

Horowitz, Michael C. “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power” (2018)
1:3 Texas National Security Review, online: TNSR < https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligenceinternational-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>.
Also
here
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/65638/TNSR-Vol-1-Iss3_Horowitz.pdf?sequence=2.
7
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Ethics and Autonomous Weapon Systems: An
Ethical
Basis
for
Human
Control?
(Geneva,
3
April
2018),
online
(pdf):
<https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/69961/icrc_ethics_and_autonomous_weapon_systems_report_3_a
pril_2018.pdf>.
6
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This study hypothesizes that Canada has, broadly speaking, followed a transparent and
identifiable perspective toward AI and IHL. More clarification, however, is needed in some
aspects of militarized AI including addressing controversial military technologies
adequately such as the regulation of autonomous and lethal autonomous weapon systems
that I will investigate further. Given this hypothesis, studying the Canadian perspective as
an example of national transparent practice, and bringing in a comparative example of U.S.
policies, I demonstrate that States must clarify AI military conduct under the principles of
IHL, and their flexibility in regulating the technologies. I also ultimately suggest that
creating an independent regulatory organization(s) can be the effective and “decisive step
in ensuring the comprehensive implementation of IHL” 8. I also examine the American
perspective because the U.S. has taken explicit policies about military AI and legal
justifications for their use. There still exist gray areas that are the source of debate about
transparent national policy in that country.
With the comparative approach, I identify strengths and weaknesses in national and
international rules regarding military AI boundaries since law needs to maintain the same
rate of progress as militarized AI. In this thesis, I attempt to explore further challenges that
are resulting from militarized AI. I will point out that one of the best ways to determine
how to regulate military AI is by studying national and international regulations
simultaneously. This approach may be useful in applying national regulations under IHL
and will be reached by looking at the literature on the relationship between national and
international law and describing its relevance to my study.

8

International Committee of the Red Cross, A Manual on the Domestic Implementation of International
Humanitarian
Law
(Geneva,
ICRC,
2015)
at
131,
online
(pdf):
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4028.pdf.
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The relationship between national and international law
While there is a theory that accepts that national and international legal systems form
a universal legal system, 9 another theory holds the view that international law and national
law (domestic law) are two separate legal systems. 10 However, holding distinctive
perspectives between national and international law does not mean there is no relationship
between these interconnected legal systems. As it happens many States apply partially each
of these perspectives to apply international law in their national legal systems. Below, I
explain the status of national law in international law and vice versa that will help to lay
the groundwork for the next portion of this analysis.
National law and its status in international law
The national law of States has a privileged legal status in international law. First,
national law applies within the boundaries of a country whilst international law regulates
relations between countries by signing treaties and conventions. A separate and distinct
legal system of international law is created between States and may be made in several
ways 11 such as treaties and customary international law (CIL). 12 Second, even though

9

A monist perspective holds the view that international law and domestic law form part of a single universal
legal system. See Myres S. McDougal, “The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A PolicyOriented Perspective” (1959) 4 S.D. L. Rev. 25 at 29, online (pdf): < https://heinonlineorg.lawlibrary.laws.uwindsor.ca/HOL/PrintRequest?public=true&handle=hein.journals/sdlr4&div=5&start
_page=25&collection=usjournals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults&print=section&format=PDFsea
rchable&submit=Print%2FDownload>.
See also Madelaine Chiam, Monism and Dualism in International Law (Oxford Bibliographies, last reviewed:
24
February
2021),
online:
https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0168.xml
10
A dualist perspective treats the international and domestic systems of law as separate and independent.
Ibid.
11
Christopher P.M. Waters, “War Law and Its Intersections” in Ethics, Law and Military Operations, ed by
David Whetham (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 90 at 92-93.
12
Customary International Law along with general principles of law and treaties is one of the primary sources
of international law involving the principle of custom. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26
June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945, ratification by Canada 09 November
1945).
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national law and international law differ in many respects, many perspectives, insights, and
practices of national law influence the development of international law, and general legal
principles of national law may be transferred to international law.
Simply put, national law has a pivotal role in international practices and CIL. This is
one of the reasons why I will be looking at a national perspective, to better understand the
formation of CIL generally, as state practice is an element of CIL. 13 To briefly describe
CIL (a primary source in international law) at this stage, it should be said that it consists of
unwritten rules derived from the general practice of States accepted as law. 14 In other
words, it consists of practice accompanied by a belief that States are bound by that practice
as a legal obligation. A practice’s acceptance as law is referred to as opinio juris.15 As such,
two elements of CIL are consistent international practice by states and approval of the
practice by the international community (opinio juris). In customary IHL, this practice is
present in a number of official documents, including military manuals, national legislation,
and case law in addition to official accounts of military operations.16
Through national constitutions and legislative provisions, ensuring respect for and
prohibiting the violation of international law can be guaranteed. Constitutions often specify
how international law should interact with domestic law as they contain provisions that
regulate the status of international law in the domestic legal system. 17 So it is another

13

See for example Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and
Customary International Law” (1995), 17:109 Michigan Journal of International Law 110 at 136.
14
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 12.
15
It is the opinion or belief in legal obligation that a specific action is legally required, or an action was
carried out as a legal obligation and it can be claimed by military powers to repudiate reaching the most
comprehensive legal structure in national and international legislation.
16
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Questions &
Answers, 15-08-2005, online: ICRC: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/customarylaw-q-and-a-150805.htm
17
Antonio Cassese, Modern Constitutions and International Law” (1985) 192 RECUEIL DES COURS 331.
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reason why I look at a national perspective to better understand IHL, specifically because
the behavior of States during armed conflict could be subject to principles outside of the
realm of treaties.18 As such, looking at the relationship between national and international
law in the domestic constitutional order, and international legal order is vital.
International law and its status in national law

A distinctive feature of the international and national legal system is primary sources.
In international law, primary sources are treaties or conventions, i.e. agreements between
states, CIL, and general principles of law. Needless to say, although many international
rules have been codified by states in international treaties, customary rules still remain
relevant in contemporary armed conflicts. CIL and general principles of law are defined in
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statutes as sources of law.19 When primary
sources of international law like treaties or CIL are unavailable and undeveloped,
international tribunals rely on these general principles, common to different legal systems,
to fill gaps. General principles of law help resolve both procedural and substantive
concerns. The advent of international legal regimes, such as IHL, has given this source
much importance. Good faith20 is an example of a general legal principle which in armed

18

Ibid. For example, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are written agreements in which states formally outline
certain rules.
19
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 12. According to Article 38 of the International
Court of Justice Statute, the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are sources of
international law. General principles of law may arise either from national law or by international law. They
address international issues not already protected by treaty provisions or customary rules. One of the most
important principles of international law is good faith, which forms the foundation for treaty law.
See also Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953,
reprinted by Cambridge University Press 2006).
20
See Steven Reinhold, “Good Faith in International Law” (2013), 2 UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
40,
online
(pdf):
<https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1470678/1/2UCLJLJ40%20%20Good%20Faith.pdf>. Talya Uçaryılmaz, “The Principle of Good Faith in Public International Law”
(2020), 68 1 Estudios de Deusto 43. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.18543/ed-68(1)-2020pp43-59>. The author
says “good faith manifests itself as pacta sunt servanda as the basis of international treaty law. As a principle
referring to honesty, loyalty and reasonableness, it guarantees the prohibition of the abuse of power and
provides equitable solutions in legal relationships.” See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23
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situations, along with proportionality may be useful in complementing and enforcing IHL.
General principles of law are derived from national legal systems and can be understood
as concepts of domestic law that apply to all legal systems.
In contrast, primary sources of national law are laws and regulations containing
constitutions, statutes, acts, legal cases, judicial decisions, and so forth. The national law
of each state can be considered as evidence of state practice, as a unilateral international
legal action under certain circumstances.21 In some cases, domestic court decisions can rely
directly on international law, having a dynamic effect on international law, as they
contribute to either shaping it or helping interpreters ascertain it. 22 Domestic judicial
decisions enable states to respect their international obligations by enforcing international
law domestically.
Second, in the domestic law of some states, international law is explicitly referred to.
States which refer to international rules in their domestic law, may recognize and accept

May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art. 26: “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.” The general legal principle of good faith applies to both international and
non-international armed conflicts and must be upheld for both types of conflicts. See International Committee
of the Red Cross, IHL database, Customary IHL-Rule 66. Non-Hostile Contacts between the Parties to
Conflict. Online: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule66. For the protection of
civilians during military operations, IHL rules must be interpreted in good faith.
21
Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. Reports 472 at para 46. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated: “It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of
this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration
that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of
a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with
the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though
not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the
nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction
from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent
with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.”
See also Byers, supra note 13.
22
Samantha Besson, “Human Rights Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of
Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators”, in August Reinisch, Mary E Footer, & Christina Binder
eds., International Law and …: Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2016) 43-66, at 48.
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international law in various forms, either as supreme law or as their applicable domestic
law such as the private law. Generally, any state bound by international law is obliged to
lay down appropriate rules or regulations in accordance with its domestic law to implement
international obligations within its territory. Note that states have no right to invoke the
provisions of domestic law as justification for their non-compliance with international law.
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 23 states: “a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”
Thus, the national implementation of legislation does not justify a state's violation of any
international obligation as a matter of international law.24
Moreover, although domestic law is enacted only to regulate internal affairs within the
territory of a state, this does not mean that domestic law is invalid at the international level
or can be invoked. International law, on a broader scale, includes the law of treaties, as
well as customary international law that is evidenced in part, by state practice which itself
can be evidenced through reference to domestic law. Thus, international law and domestic
law are not separate from each other and are interrelated. This interrelationship is revealed
in the two ways in which Canada receives international law as Canada takes a different
approach depending on the source of international law in question.
Concerning treaties (as a matter of international law), the Government of Canada
signed and ratified agreements to create binding legal obligations on Canada. For example,
with respect to IHL, national governments must formally adopt IHL treaties by the process

23

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, supra note 20 (accession by
Canada 27 January 1980).
24
Secretary of State Bayard, Instruction to Mr. Connery, charge to Mexico, Nov. 1, 1887, II MOORE’S
DIGEST 235, online: Office of the Historian https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1887/d491
“A government cannot appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to demands for the fulfillment of
international duties. Such regulations may either exceed or fall short of the requirements of international law,
and in either case that law furnishes the test of the nation’s liability and not its own municipal rules.”
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of ratification or accession. However, generally speaking neither ratification nor signature
suffice for a treaty to apply as a matter of national law,25 and states must undertake “certain
domestic actions of compliance including passing legislation and taking regulatory and
practical measures” 26 for the rules of IHL to be fully effective. In Canadian law, the
adoption of a treaty is a legislative act. Treaties must be implemented through legislation
in the Canadian legislature before they can have the force of law domestically.27
In contrast, concerning CIL, it does not require legislative implementation and it is
adopted via the doctrine of adoption as part of Canadian law. 28 Due to the fact that CIL is
uncodified in any particular sources, either determining its rules can be complicated or all
states may not accept CIL rules to be entered automatically into their national law. As such,
the position of international law within national law depends upon a state’s domestic
legislation, and states may enact domestic legislation to implement international law such
as treaty provisions.
The goal of this thesis is to improve and align domestic policy making with
international legal obligations as it pertains to new military AI technologies. Accordingly,
a study of the interface between national and international regulation will be undertaken in
building more cohesive national policies in compliance with IHL rules and creating more
comprehensive provisions on new military AI technologies.

25

See Hugh M. Kindred et al, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 8th ed
(Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 2014), at 9, 160.
26
International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law in Domestic Law (January 1,
2015), online: < https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-domestic-law>
27
André Ouellette, Report of Canada's System of Justice on Bijuralism and Taxation: International Aspects
(Ottawa, ON: Canada, Department of Justice, 2003), Interpretation of Treaties and Domestic Law (Date
modified: 2015-01-07), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/harmonization/ouell/toc_inttdm_int.html>
28
Nevsun Resources Ltd. v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5 at para 90.
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This thesis is composed of five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter
Two sets out the military and legal context, describing artificial intelligence in military
systems and its implications. Chapter Two also outlines the general framework of
international humanitarian law, before exploring IHL’s applicability to AI.
Chapter Three explores international pathways on military AI and the importance of
IHL coverage, with a specific focus on IHL treaties as well as the Martens Clause. I will
also show the lack of details in some Articles of the IHL conventions that ought to be
addressed and revisited.
The fourth chapter will be an attempt to study national approaches to military AI and
the importance of transparent national strategies. For that purpose, the Canadian
perspective will be analyzed at both national and international levels to find out what are
the implications of AI to Canadian policymaking. I also take a comparative perspective by
touching on American approaches to military AI. The reason I explore the US perspective
is to show what kind of activities have attracted legal justification on military AI in the
leading military power and a close ally of Canada and to examine what gray areas have not
been properly addressed in that country. Specifically, I argue that Canada has not
sufficiently addressed controversial military technologies namely lethal autonomous
weapon systems.
In the fifth chapter, recommendations will be explained by proposing suggestions to
address deficiencies and ambiguities in international law. I also recommend measures to
address emerging technologies adequately in Canada’s policy.
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In conclusion, I provide a framework for evolving Canada’s regulatory approach to
align new military AI with IHL obligations. Canada’s approach can set a needed example
for other states, where exceptions to legal principles cause flaws and shortcomings in the
advanced military AI arena.
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CHAPTER 2
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
The historical period of rapid military technology development traces back to World
Wars I and II. World War I is recognized as a period in which advanced technologies, such
as the tank and aircraft, were introduced into modern warfare. World War I, as the first
technology war, “was history’s single largest revolution in military tactics and
technologies.” 29 The development of technologies for combat and weaponry laid the
groundwork for incremental technology improvements thereafter. The Second World War
also saw advances in technologies for the purpose of winning the war. After World War II,
not only did the desire to develop military capabilities using advanced technologies
increase among international actors, but many developed and developing states have been
investing heavily in the advancement of means and methods of warfare that rely on AI. 30
One of the major outcomes of AI innovation is the prominent growth of autonomy in
weapons systems, namely the Autonomous Weapon System (AWS). But the question is,
what is AWS?
Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS)
Autonomous advances in the means and methods of warfare are among the AI
breakthroughs that fundamentally change the conduct of war and decisions on the
battlefield. The development of AWS appears highly desirable for militaries to deploy as

David T. Zabecki. “Military Developments of World War I” (2015), online: International Encyclopedia of
the First World War (pdf): https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/pdf/1914-1918-Onlinemilitary_developments_of_world_war_i-2015-05-07.pdf.
30
National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, Final Report: National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence (Arlington, VA: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021) online
(pdf): https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf
29
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it offers undeniable capabilities. Since there is a lack of accepted definitions regarding
AWS and what constitutes AWS internationally, providing an overview of the current
definitions about AWS is essential.
This definition, based on capability parameters of AWS, provided by the United
Kingdom and used by the UK Armed Forces explains AWS as follows:
An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher-level intent and
direction. From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a
system is able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable
of deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending
on human oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the
overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual
actions may not be.31
Another definition favored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 32
-the lead international agency on IHL- emphasizes the nature of tasks that AWS performs
autonomously. The definition presents autonomous weapons that would encompass any
type of weapon with autonomy in its critical functions. The ICRC defines AWS:
An autonomous weapon system can learn or adapt its functioning in response to
changing circumstances in the environment in which it is deployed. A truly
autonomous system would have artificial intelligence that would have to be capable
of implementing IHL.33

31

British Ministry of Defence, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). JDP 0-30.2:
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Unmanned Aircraft Systems (DCDC: Shrivenham, August. 2017), online (pdf):
<
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/673940/d
octrine_uk_uas_jdp_0_30_2.pdf>.
32
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) is the principal humanitarian organization ensuring
humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and people affected by armed violence. State parties
to the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols gave this organization a specific legal mandate to act
in the event of an armed conflict where IHL determines when it occurs, in legal terms protecting victims of
international and internal armed conflicts. The operation of ICRC is based on IHL comprising the four
Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, as well as the resolutions of the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
As a result, working toward promoting IHL and universal humanitarian principles are examples of its
humanitarian missions. See; International Committee of the Red Cross, Mandate and Mission, online: ICRC:
https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission
33
International Committee of the Red Cross, Report 2015, supra note 3.
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The second part of this definition explicitly recognizes that regulating AI weapons’
compliance with IHL is crucial. Notably, an increasing number of combat operations are
expected to be carried out by AWS in the future which raises concerns, especially about
the lack of transparency34 and unpredictability of these weapons systems.35
While the military use of AWS seems unavoidable, military technologies have been
addressed through several international measures such as the United Nations (UN)
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)36 as the appropriate forum37 for the
discussion of military autonomous technologies including Lethal Autonomous Weapons

34

Ibid, at 13.
IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, Reframing Autonomous Weapons
Systems, (IEEE Standards Association) online (pdf): <https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieeestandards/standards/web/documents/other/ead_reframing_autonomous_weapons_v2.pdf
36
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II, III, IV and V), 10
October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983).
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), 10 October, 1980, 1342
UNTS 137 (Adopted by the United Nations Conference on 10 October 1980, UN Doc A/Conf.95/15).
(entered into force 2 December 1983).
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Prohibitions or
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December 1983).
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(Protocol IV), 13 October 1995, 1380 UNTS 370 (entered into force 30 July 1998).
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which may be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Explosive Remnants of
War (Protocol V), 28 November 2003, 2399 UNTS 1 (entered into force 12 November 2006).
The provisions of this convention apply to those countries which agree to be bound by its terms. The CCW
was adopted in 1980, and it has also referred to as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The Convention
only contains general requirements. There are no clear regulations restricting the use of specific weapons.
The Protocols attached to the Convention contain provisions prohibiting or restricting the use of specific
weapons. See; Jozef Goldblat, Inhumane conventional weapons: efforts to strengthen the constraints”, in
SIPRI Yearbook (1995) on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, online
(pdf):<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI%20Yearbook%201995.pdf>
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Informal Meeting of Experts, Report of the 2016 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), (Geneva, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2016) online (pdf):
https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons__Informal_Meeting_of_Experts_(2016)/ReportLAWS_2016_AdvancedVersion.pdf.
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Systems (LAWS). Integrating AI in the context of the military arms race and armed conflict
has caused significant debates concerning the legality of this kind of AI weapon as a special
type of autonomous military system that uses AI to independently search for, identify,
engage targets, and employ a weapon system without human intervention.
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)
Militarized AI has already become a new reality of warfare and decreases the influence
of humans on the immediate decision-making of using force in armed conflicts. AWS is
increasingly being used in contemporary armed conflicts, which can increase the
possibility of AI use in future weapons systems, especially LAWS as weapon systems with
full autonomy that are able to identify, select and target without “Meaningful Human
Control (MHC).”38 MHC is a key topic in IHL arguments over how to limit the application
of LAWS and allow humans to make meaningful decisions that comply with IHL and other
requirements. Autonomy in AI, as some argue, is the ability to function without a human
operator.39 For LAWS, however, there is some controversy as to what autonomy means or
how it operates.
Although there is not an agreed definition of LAWS, the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) Directive defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”40 The concept is also

According to the principle of “meaningful human control”, the ones who should ultimately remain in
control of, and responsible for decisions about lethal military operations are humans, neither computers nor
algorithms. See; Filippo Santoni de Sio & Jeroen van den Hoven, “Meaningful Human Control over
Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account” (2018), Front. Robot. AI, doi: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00015.
39
George A. Bekey, Autonomous Robots, From Biological Inspiration to Implementation and Control
(Cambridge, UK: MIT Press Books, 2005).
40
United States Department of Defense, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, DIRECTIVE No.3000.09 (United
States, Department of Defense, 2012 Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017), online (pdf):
<https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf>.
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known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.”41 Human out of the loop is defined
by Human Rights Watch (HRW, a prominent non-governmental organization that serves
as global coordinator of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots) as robots with the capability
to select targets and deliver force without any human intervention.42 As of yet, weapon
systems with full lethal autonomy have not been deployed; however, weapons with varying
degrees of autonomy and lethality have been deployed by some countries.43 They are the
reality, and using them in military operations is not only inevitable but also possible. The
most controversial aspect is about the development and use of LAWS that are capable of
making decisions regarding human targets.
Another related concept is “human in the loop”44 or semi-autonomous weapon systems.
The Patriot missiles systems fit the definition of semi-autonomous weapons that can
identify individual or specific targets selected by a human operator, as it requires a human

This directive “establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for the development and use of
autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including manned and unmanned
platforms.”
41
Kelley M. Sayler, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Washington, DC:
Congressional
Research
Service,
CRS
Rpt
IF11150,
2020),
Online:
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11150>.
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process used in autonomous weapons enables weapons to act quicker and at much greater scale. Such
weapons can change their pre-programmed parameters or even alter their goal function. For example, there
will be a need to program autonomous and lethal autonomous weapons to differentiate between their targets,
but such programming may result in inaccurate interpretations of information, making an indiscriminate
attack possible, especially where human intervention is limited. See also Bonnie Docherty et al., Losing
Humanity, The Case against Killer Robots (Human Rights Watch, 2012), online:
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots#>.
43
Including United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and the Republic of Korea. See; Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom - Reaching Critical Will Program, Fact Sheet on Fully
Autonomous Weapons, online: https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/fact-sheets/criticalissues/7972-fully-autonomous-weapons
44
In addition to human in the loop, there is a definition for “Human-on-the-Loop Weapons as robots that can
select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override the robots’ actions.”
It is believed by the US Air Force and the UK Ministry of Defence that fully autonomous weapons will be
developed within the coming years, and their capabilities are expected to be so high that humans will no
longer be able to contribute effectively to a wide range of systems and processes. See Docherty, supra note
42.
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operator to initiate an attack. The Patriot anti-missile system can select targets
autonomously but requires humans to launch a missile. Once the missile is launched, it can
hit its target, and human control will not be possible afterward. Another example of humansupervised autonomous weapon system is Israel’s Iron Dome as a defense system to
counter rocket attacks.45 The increasing speed of AI developments in the military and its
growing role in future operations makes it likely that human control will decrease in
military operations over time.
A clear example of this is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),46 commonly known as
a drone, another automated weapon system (remote-controlled weapons systems) that uses
algorithms to select a target and carry out an attack without human intervention and human
decision-making. The Harpy weapons system for instance is the current autonomous UAV
in use developed by Israel Aerospace Industries. Once launched, it can detect or attack
enemy radar systems without any human intervention.47
The employment of new AI weapons raises substantial legal and ethical issues, as well
as the danger of causing significant human suffering. It is consequently critical to assess
the legality of new weapons, means, and methods of conflict under IHL, including CIL.
With these evolving systems and their growing importance in mind, legal review of

Christoph Bartneck et al., “Military Uses of AI” in: An Introduction to Ethics in Robotics and AI.
SpringerBriefs in Ethics. (UK: Springer International Publishing, 2021), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/9783-030-51110-4_11. Michael Schmitt, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Humanitarian
Law: A Reply to the Critics” (2013) 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 3.
46
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operates with no pilot on board. It may operate under a human
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Systems (UAS), (International Civil Aviation Organization, approved by the Secretary General and published
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authority,
Order
Number:
CIR328,
2011),
online
(pdf):
<https://www.icao.int/meetings/uas/documents/circular%20328_en.pdf>.
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Ariel Shapiro, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Selected Implications for International Security and for
Canada, no. 2019-55-E, (Ottawa, Canada: Library of Parliament, 2019) online (pdf):
<https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/InBriefs/PDF/2019-55-e.pdf>.
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military AI technologies that present new implications must be addressed in different
forums. Inconclusive debates at the CCW on AWS demonstrate that states are aware of
these realities.
One of the increasing debates in military operations concerns Unmanned Combat
Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), also known as combat drones or battlefield UAV Combat
drones. The Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare defined
UCAVs as “unmanned military aircraft of any size which carries and launches a weapon,
or which can use onboard technology to direct such a weapon to a target.”48 No doubt
evolving UCAVs and UAVs provide militaries with an unprecedented scale to conduct
operations which will ultimately raise profound questions for IHL and its applicability.
The implications of AI in AWS, and LAWS (with no internationally agreed definition
which leads to a range of possible working definitions) would result in great ethical and
legal controversy. If the use of AWS and LAWS develops, it would not only complicate
the application of the IHL principles but also could be a catastrophic threat to humanity.
This issue as raised by some is that “no particular autonomous or artificial intelligence
system currently has the necessary skills to discriminate between combatants and
innocents.” 49 As a result, in light of the new revolution in the military use of these sorts of
weapon systems, the rapid pace of militarized AI advances has drawn the international
community’s attention. In this context, if the international community fails to prohibit or
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even regulate AWS and LAWS under IHL, these weapons are likely to play unclear roles
in the future of warfare.
There is no doubt that AI military technological advancement is still at an initial stage.
This, therefore, begs the question of what the implications would be of military use of AI.
By way of technical context then, in the next section, I aim to investigate the significance
of military AI, particularly, in AWS and LAWS. In the second part of this chapter, I will
set out the applicable IHL framework.
Artificial Intelligence in Military Systems
AI demonstrates a wide variety of abilities in military applications, to the level of
human intelligence and beyond, that can operate in new environments where human
intervention is limited. There are a wide variety of implications, ranging from the various
operations this technology can perform to the dangers it poses. Regardless of advantages
that can be brought about by the concept of military AI use (assisting militaries in their
decision-making as an example), it also has the ability to make decisions independently
while deploying AWS. Rapid improvements in AI with unique capabilities to enhance
military operations have propelled anew vast aspects of this technology to the forefront of
military attention. Based on the development of AI and its capability to revolutionize the
future of warfare, militaries are inclined toward implementing AI algorithms in new means
of warfare systems.
The military AI systems with significant AI capacities, however, makes the situation
difficult to precisely assess the associated dangers, risks, challenges, and consequences in
warfare. Even attempting to control new military AI technology is difficult because not
enough can be predicted about its consequences. It is vital to have extensive conversations
20

about the possible repercussions of militarized AI in warfare. Other implications of military
use of AI are the tendency of a small number of states to be a supreme power in the military
realm, a threat to security, 50 raising the possibility of a global arms race, and putting
humanity in danger which I will subsequently discuss.
Military AI could potentially promote an AI arms race, changing the character of war
and the future scenarios of warfare. As such, the advent of this technological advancement
has given rise to potential national and international challenges, in particular when it comes
to the reliance on AI technologies by military powers. This dependence propels “great
powers”51 to make an effort to strengthen their AI competencies to be a supreme power on
both national and international levels. A rise in military AI will lead to more competition
between states to be equipped with the most progressive technologies to surpass their
rivals. What complicates this matter is “taking this competition seriously”52 by military
powers. Due to this tendency towards applying AI in military systems and states’ quest for
superiority in the military realm, states could develop weapons to project any target which
could conflict with international legal regimes and endanger both state and civilian
security.
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DoD news https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2567486/artificial-intelligence-keyto-maintaining-military-economic-advantages-leaders/

21

Meanwhile, some countries such as the United States are integrating AI in military
systems and combat. 53 For Canada, some argue that it “must adopt the military AI
technologies as they become mainstream.”54 In the near future, more countries are likely
to see AI and the substantial abilities offered by AI systems as providing a competitive
edge for their militaries in global leadership.
On the one hand, the leadership of countries in developing AI animates concerns about
international competition and security. Since AI can affect both national and international
security, the international community is dealing with this consequence from several angles,
moving from the future development of weaponized AI to changes in the nature of conflicts
and conduct of countries to meet a civilian-centered approach in all debates that means
“putting people at the core of the security discussions.”55 On the other hand, the capabilities
of military AI continue to advance at incredible rates, and AI will make military systems
more autonomous. As a result, developments in military AI may not only lead to a global
arms race, but their application to any weapon system makes the use of such technologies
questionable from ethical and legal perspectives.
While AI technologies are increasingly finding unprecedented military usage,
investigating the consequences of AI technology regulation should be done on a larger
scale either through international measures or national policies to cover possible legal
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challenges and conflicts. These existing debates need to respond to the questions: what is
IHL? and how do IHL rules apply to militarized AI systems?
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Modern humanitarian law on warfare traces back to the eighteenth century. The 1899
Hague Regulations provide an important landmark in this development. The “Hague law,”
“Hague stream” or “Hague conventions”56 include a series of international treaties and
declarations that contain rules regulating warfare, and governing the use of means, methods
of warfare as well as the conduct of hostilities. Due to the importance of human protection,
under Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations, for example, the employment of arms or
projectiles that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury is prohibited.57
In addition to the provisions of the Hague Conventions that are among the main treaty
sources of IHL forming the core of this legal regime, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
(GCs) -sometimes called the “Geneva stream”- are also part of the IHL rules which first
were codified in the 19th century. A particular landmark in this stream was the adoption of
the 1864 Geneva Convention58 that was expanded on in subsequent iterations, including
the 1949 GCs to protect non-combatant civilians and soldiers who had been taken out of
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combat by virtue of injury or capture. In the wake of the first treaty's adoption in 1864, it
was revised and later replaced by the GCs in 1906, 1929, and 1949. The first and second
GCs are close in structure covering the protection for the wounded and sick of soldiers on
land during the war, and shipwrecked military personnel at sea respectively. The Third
Geneva Convention concerns the treatment of prisoners of war and replaced the Prisoners
of War Convention of 1929.59 These conventions were concerned with only combatants,
not with civilians. But the Fourth Geneva Convention is about the protection of civilians
in times of war and concerns the protection of populations against certain consequences of
war.
The rules emanating from the GCs govern the protection of war victims. In order to
protect those who are not fighting in the armed conflict, the GCs dictate what can and
cannot be done during warfare. The GCs of 1949, however, did not develop the Hague
rules. These two streams have been advanced in the 1977 Additional Protocols (APs).60
The 1977 APs were “created to fill gaps left”61 by the 1949 GCs and have been playing an
important role in strengthening both the Hague rules and the GCs. Additionally, the APs
complemented the GCs in terms of rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts.
The Two APs were adopted in response to an increasing number of non-international
armed conflicts (civil wars), and the third AP was adopted in 2005 creating an additional

59

Geneva Convention (III) relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135
(entered into force 21 October 1950).
60
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, arts 48 & 51, (entered
into force 7 December, 1978). [AP I]. see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, art 1 (entered into force 7 December 1978). [AP II]. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005, 2404 UNTS 261 (entered into force 14 January 2007). [AP III].
61
Waters, supra note 11. at 101.

24

protection emblem, the Red Crystal. The GCs and their APs are international treaties that
contain the rules protecting people who do not take part or no longer participate in the
hostilities as well as protecting combatants from superfluous injury/unnecessary suffering.
Most importantly, the Protocols provide for comprehensive protection for civilians and
civilian objects against the effects of military operations “given that a majority of victims
of warfare are victims of civil wars.”62
Since the focus of this thesis will be on IHL as lex specialis, 63 applicable to the
occurrence of armed conflict, which seeks to protect civilians from the abuses of war and
violence, different types of armed conflict and IHL principles will be addressed in the
following section.
Types of Armed Conflict and IHL Principles
There are two types of armed conflicts in legal terms that IHL distinguishes: an
international armed conflict (a conflict among two or more states) and a non-international
armed conflict (a conflict between government forces and nongovernmental armed groups,
or between such groups only64 “within the territory of a single state.”)65
International armed conflict under IHL treaties will be placed within the scope of
common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as follows:
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In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.66
Protections in non-international armed conflict, which are less restrictive on states than
in international armed conflict, are governed by common Article 3 to the GCs of 1949 67;
and Article 1 of AP II68. Generally, IHL governs the conduct of armed forces engaged in
an armed conflict, determining who and what is protected or targeted, and under what
restrictions or limitations on weapons or tactics. Since the determination of when an event
constitutes armed conflict under international law is regulated by the body of IHL, several
IHL fundamental principles particularly apply to military AI activities during an armed
conflict in which states are required to comply to choose the means and methods of warfare.
Some of the key principles to start with, as recognized in Article 51 of Protocol I Additional
to the Geneva Conventions, are namely:
1. Distinction: the necessity of distinguishing between civilians and combatants, also the
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.69 Article 48 of AP I imposes a stringent obligation on
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the Parties to the conflict to distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives at all times.
2. Proportionality70: This principle is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of AP I and repeated in
Article 57.71 This rule, also considered to be a norm of CIL in both international and noninternational armed conflicts as a result of state practice, specifies that parties to a conflict
must not launch an attack against lawful military objectives if the attack “may be expected
to cause” excessive civilian harm. Determining whether an attack is proportionate or not
needs a human judgement that a fully autonomous weapon could not have. Canada has also
considered this principle in its codes of conduct and LOAC manuals several times72 LOAC
manuals are quite useful for recognizing relevant treaties and CIL provisions. Developing
IHL manuals facilitates policy makers and legislators' compliance with IHL and its

b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by
this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian
objects without distinction. Protocols I and II are international treaties that supplement the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. They significantly improve the legal protection covering civilians and the wounded,
and - for the first time - lay down detailed humanitarian rules that apply in civil wars.
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implementation at the domestic level. CIL will be shaped by state practice, and manuals
can help create or develop state practice, thereby state practice can be used as evidence to
support these rules as norms of CIL.
3. Precautions in an attack are also norms of CIL. Precautions are included in article 57 of
AP I, providing that constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians,
and civilian objects in the conduct of military operations. Parties must take all possible
precautions when selecting the methods and means of warfare so as to prevent and
minimize incidental civilian loss of life, injury, and objects damage.73
One of the main purposes of IHL principles is the protection of civilians. Article 51
sets out that the “civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from
military operations.”74 Many of the rules are derived from the principles of distinction and
proportionality to protect civilians. The distinction principle with proportionality must be
balanced against military necessity.75 The necessity of military action can be determined
through an objective analysis of a situation. The practical requirements of a military
situation should be limited by the humanity principle. Fully autonomous weapons are
unlikely to be able to balance between the IHL principles of military necessity and
humanity. Since AI weapons systems including autonomous lethal weapons systems raise
ethical and legal issues related to human control, particularly when it comes to critical
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functions such as target selection and engagement,76 it appears a formidable task for states
to develop AI weapons systems that behave like a human or even more cautiously than a
human being during battle. However, the learning capacity of AI would be followed up by
the significant outcome of surpassing humans77 and breaking human control. In this regard,
the European Union Committee on Legal Affairs has declared:
Ultimately there is a possibility that within the space of a few decades AI could
surpass human intellectual capacity in a manner which, if not prepared for, could
pose a challenge to humanity’s capacity to control its creation and, consequently,
perhaps also to its capacity to be in charge of its destiny and to ensure the survival
of the species.78
Although drafted prior to the development of AI, these IHL rules apply to all weapon
systems in warfare. Under IHL, states have a responsibility to ensure that their weapon
systems use is consistent with the conduct of hostilities rules. Therefore, examining the
applicability of IHL to new weapons and AI is necessary.
IHL Applicability to AI
Even though the primary IHL instruments were drafted before the development of AI,
the scope of the IHL application is designed to regulate all military activities, including
new weapons, during armed conflicts. As mentioned above, IHL through its rules on means
and methods of warfare places limits on the development and use of AWS. Although IHL
rules apply to AWS technologies, it is not without challenges. Regarding LAWS and IHL
regulation, the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 79 has confirmed that
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“international humanitarian law continues to apply fully to all weapons systems, including
the potential development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems.”80 There are
indeed IHL legal principles providing constraints to shape the behavior of states,81 but there
is still a need to review IHL to realize the applicability and suitability of its rules as
technology advances.
Clearly, technological advances and challenges exert pressure on existing legal norms
of warfare giving rise to concerns that new law is needed, or other policies should be taken.
The most practical challenge is that autonomous technologies have not yet been banned. I
suspect that this is mainly because a complete ban is nearly impossible as these
technologies are developing incrementally, there is no internationally agreed definition for
them, and militaries are inclined toward maintaining a technological edge. This is why a
complete ban is likely neither possible nor can be universally accepted. Thus, some
strategies for regulating AWS in the context of armed conflicts should be developed.82 On
top of that, there should be clear definitions to fully understand these kinds of technologies
and their specific aspects so as to regulate them quickly.

Advancing Responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security, see; Group of
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All military AI systems and weapons shall be capable of operating in compliance with
these IHL rules, and states are obliged to ensure this capability while developing new
warfare systems including AWS. It is questionable whether the necessary decision-making
capabilities can be programmed into a machine. Applying such capability to machines is
still challenging for states.83 The capability of making decisions by such weapons is not
accompanied by either responsibility or accountability like a human, and it may cause a
problem to comply with IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities. 84 As a result of the
deployment of these weapons, there will be a need to hold humans accountable or
responsible for violations of IHL. Given the number of possible scenarios on the battlefield,
fully autonomous weapons might not be preprogrammed to determine if anticipated
military advantage outweighs anticipated civilian harm on a case-by-case basis, 85
especially in the context of an arms race. As a result, these types of weapons would
potentially violate IHL, endangering civilians. AWS and LAWS, currently are incapable
of assessing the harm to the civilian population or civilian objects and cannot be trained to
observe the rule of legal norms and IHL. Therefore, the military application of AI in
autonomous weapons is unlikely to fully respect IHL principles due to the lack of certainty
about how AI will behave in emerging technologies. Consequently, in light of the
development of new military AI technologies, carrying out legal reviews is of the utmost
importance.
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To carry out a review of IHL or the new weapons, CIL should also be taken into
account. IHL treaties alongside CIL are sources of international law, and states recognize
that they are both binding. Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of CIL under which “ a state is
bound to carry out in good faith the obligations which it has assumed by a treaty.” 86 The
application of CIL by national and international courts and tribunals demonstrates its
binding nature.87 To take the provisions of two Conventions on land warfare as an example,
they are considered as embodying rules of CIL which means they are binding on states that
are not even formally parties to them.88 As such I will elaborate on CIL in the coming
section to point out its role in regulating international relations and military activities.
Customary International Law (CIL)
CIL refers to a set of legal principles that limit the activities of states but are neither
codified nor written down. When states continuously participate in a pattern of behavior
and a consensus develops among them that the activity is required under international law,
CIL emerges.89 CIL comes into effect when necessary, particularly when states have not
ratified IHL treaties. It is accepted that the rules and principles of IHL treaties governing
the conduct of hostilities and protecting people who are not taking a part in hostilities apply
to all states regardless of whether they adhere to such treaties. For example, the four GCs
of 1949 have been ratified universally, while other treaties of IHL such as the 1977 APs to

“Article 20. Pacta Sunt Servanda,” (1935) 29:S2 AJIL977. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2213687>.
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Canada considered that “the doctrine of adoption operates in Canada such that prohibitive rules of customary
international law should be incorporated into domestic law in the absence of conflicting legislation.” (at para
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the GCs have not90, but are relevant for all current international and non-international (civil
wars) armed conflicts. 91 It is said that a number of customary rules of IHL define the
obligations of parties to a non-international armed conflict in much greater detail than
treaty law.92
Even if there is a gap resulting from the lack of ratification of relevant IHL treaties,
CIL fills these gaps, and all states are bound by customary law. The advantage of CIL is
that it is not necessary for states to formally accept rules to be bound by it. CIL is created
through state practice provided that state practice is “extensive, virtually uniform,
representative and accepted as law.”93 As the IHL treaties and CIL are both sources of the
same body of law, there is in one sense no difference in their applicability. In general,
treaties and international conventions are binding on states that have expressed their
consent to be bound by such treaties, usually through ratification. Therefore, states and
militaries have a responsibility to ensure respect for the law. If any violation through any
kind of means and methods of military technology happens, IHL rules on accountability
must be applied (although unfortunately, they have not always been enforced).
Accordingly, this study addresses the possibilities of developing the regulation of the
military use of AI by focusing on international and national pathways on AI. The fact is
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that international legal rules are still required to keep pace with the AI technologies in
military content, and widespread legal measures should be applied. In the next chapter, I
will discuss other relevant IHL conventions to evaluate if the coverage of international
norms is adequate to regulate military AI.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL PATHWAYS ON MILITARY AI: THE IMPORTANCE OF
IHL COVERAGE
As previously mentioned, IHL provisions limit the means and methods of warfare. In
cases of armed conflict, IHL mandates that participants follow the principles of distinction,
proportionality, humanity and military necessity. However, the more military AI
technology advances, the more clarification of existing international rules are needed
because military AI, particularly AWS and LAWS, are likely to be non-compliant with
IHL principles. Simply put, the rapid advancement of AI technologies, and their integration
into autonomous weapons results in tremendous conflicts and challenges which ultimately
have revealed the necessity of clarification in IHL as the main international pathway to
assess the legality of the new generation of militarized AI.
Clarification of IHL Coverage with a glance at Article 36 & Common Article 1
In general, there is no doubt about the applicability of IHL to new weaponry and other
technological developments, as Article 36 (new weapons) of the First Additional Protocol
to the Geneva Conventions declares:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting
Party.94
The Article imposes a practical obligation on states to demonstrate that their right to
choose the means of warfare is limited. It shows that states are under an obligation to
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determine whether the employment of a new weapon, means, or method of warfare would
be prohibited by IHL or any other relevant rules of international law which is a mechanism
of weapon review or legal review. 95 This obligation, however, shall bind all states
regardless of being party to Protocol I or not as a result of CIL. 96 Although, states are
required to conduct legal reviews of weapons, means, or methods of warfare to determine
if their use is forbidden by international law, examining the legality of weapons with
automated and autonomous features poses several difficulties in testing weapon
performance and evaluating the risks associated.97
Automated weapons, drones (remote-controlled weapons systems), unmanned
weapons, and other modern weaponry are already in use in armed conflicts. Whether these
weapons were created or will be developed in accordance with the requirements of Article
36 of AP I can be questioned. Consequently, it is not outside the realm of possibility that
their use in armed conflicts violates IHL regulations.
Besides the necessity of conducting a legal review of weapons, states are committed to
ensuring respect for IHL under the 1949 GCs, Common Article 1, and customary
international law that creates a binding obligation to obey rules governing employment of
military technologies in warfare. Therefore, considerations must extend to the legal
obligation of states to address the challenges and opportunities, along with the wider
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implications of new military strategies while ensuring respect for IHL. Common Article 1
to the four 1949 GCs declares: “the High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”98
Common Article 1 has been accepted as a universal obligation for states and
international organizations to ensure that IHL will be implemented wherever a
humanitarian problem arises. The International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons has reinforced this assertion that
common Article 1 is “binding on all states and competent international organizations.”99
The Article is one of the basic rules governing the implementation of IHL. States should
deepen their discussions about practical measures to ensure respect for IHL when
developing and using new military AI systems. Under Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the parties to a treaty in force are bound by it, and they
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must perform it in good faith 100 States are responsible for fulfilling their obligations in
good faith. This fundamental rule is enshrined in Common Article I. It is therefore worth
noting that when states commit themselves to a treaty, it is assumed that they also intend
to implement a treaty and not violate its provisions. Obviously, the States Parties to the
GCs Conventions and APs are bound to implement these international instruments in
general and the common article in particular.
It can be interpreted that one of the forms of obligation contained in this will be
achieved through ratification of these international instruments by states. Ensuring
compliance with this Article means that State Parties in their national law must monitor the
operations of relevant executive and administrative bodies issuing the necessary
instructions in this regard. In peacetime, the State Parties should take the necessary
measures, including training, to ensure that military forces comply with the norms of
international instruments even in cases of military necessity. During peace time, and
mainly through the training of the military and even civilians, it is possible to ensure better
or more compliance with the provisions of humanitarian law.
In the interpretation of common Article 1 and ensuring respect, there is a view
supported by the ICRC which reflects today's consensus. The view is that Article 1 requires
states to ensure that the Conventions are respected by other states and non-State Parties.101
In its updated Commentaries, the ICRC interprets common Article 1 as requiring
reasonable steps for states in order to avoid and end foreseeable IHL violations by other
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actors.102 The phrase “at all times” in the Article implies applicability to states that are not
State Party, or in non-international armed conflicts regardless of military necessity. In all
situations, other states should ensure that other states’ activities are in compliance with
IHL.
Nonetheless, as a greater array of AI technologies enters into the modern battlefield,
the lack of details in this Article can be observed concerning how states will ensure respect
in practice. As currently worded, it is not clear if any specific action is required or not.
There is no guidance on how states should ensure adherence to IHL. It is necessary to move
beyond the framework provided by IHL to make progress in its application, particularly in
the context of Article 1. The lack of clarification in this Article is one of the examples of a
need for more clarification and adequacy of international rules’ coverage in regulating
military AI. The lack of details in this Article provides states with broad latitude for
abrogating their obligations in some areas. To look broadly at IHL coverage, some other
relevant IHL treaties must be discussed in the next section.

International Treaties on IHL
Setting aside the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, and the
1907 Hague Conventions, IHL is codified through specific agreements that prohibit the use
of certain weapons. These agreements include:


the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC);103
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the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW), and its four protocols;104



the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);105



the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines;106



the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM);107 and



the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.108

Other agreements that are part of IHL but do not prohibit the use of certain weapons
include:


the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, and its two protocols;109
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the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on
the involvement of children in armed conflict.110

These treaties were created as international responses to humanitarian concerns. One
of these specific treaties is the “1997 Convention on the prohibition on the use, stockpiling,
production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction”, 111 known by its
popular name, the “Ottawa Convention” or “Mine Ban Treaty.”112
As previously noted, automated weapons are a relatively recent development. By
contrast, landmines are the most well-known and widely deployed automated weapon, one
indiscriminate in nature. A landmine is an explosive device that is designed to
automatically detonate or blow when pressure is applied to it. These devices are often
installed to disable pedestrians or vehicles who come into contact with them due to an
explosion or fragments. According to Human Rights Watch, antipersonnel landmines are
indiscriminate weapons that cannot distinguish between a civilian and a soldier.113 It can
be estimated that civilians are the major victims of deploying such weapons. For its
indiscriminate nature, the production, stockpiling, usage, and transferring of landmines
have been fully banned by Mine Ban Treaty.
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According to Article 1 of this Convention, States Parties are prohibited from:
Using, developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, or
transferring to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel landmines (APLs), or
to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under the Convention.114
Depending upon whether a state is a signatory of this convention, the APLs are
considered illegal because they do not discriminate effectively. In this way, the Ottawa
Convention is an example of an international achievement related to the regulation of
military technologies, that we can look to. Automated weapons or any weapons, like land
mines, that are indiscriminate in nature have been prohibited under existing provisions of
IHL (such as article 36 of AP I), even though states are interested in developing automated
weapons for their safety, security, and effectiveness in the armed field.
It is clear that the Ottawa Convention has followed an almost comprehensive approach
under IHL that seeks the elimination of anti-personnel mines by prohibiting a wide range
of activities, specifically the development, use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of the
weapon to “protect civilian populations” 115 which is one of the essential aims of IHL.
Leaving aside the Ottawa Convention, under general IHL provisions, the use of APLs is
restricted.
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One of the provisions that are derived from the CIL rules of warfare is that parties to
an armed conflict are obliged to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to never
use any inherently indiscriminate weapon. This provision is binding on all parties in every
situation of armed conflict. Other than the Ottawa Convention, Protocol II of the UN
Convention on CCW116 regulates mines and other devices. What is apparent in the existing
CCW rules is that they were not being enforced properly in many recent conflicts when
mines were deployed. 117 Even the definition provided by the Ottawa treaty on antipersonnel mines, owing to recent developments in technologies, might need more coverage
as to whether it accounts for several types of mines or not. This issue has not been
sufficiently addressed, and the need for action regarding this ambiguity can be a concrete
step toward more transparency.118
The purpose of the Ottawa Convention is to support humanitarian actions around the
world, so the treaty’s content could be developed to cover future disproportionate
humanitarian effects. For instance, the convention does not prohibit the use of anti-tank
mines (i.e., those designed to explode when coming into contact with a vehicle) or remotely
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controlled explosive devices,119 and the distinction between antipersonnel and anti-vehicle
mines is blurred in this convention.120
Owing to recent advancements in landmine technology, the development of the treaty’s
scope would occur through international actions such as consensus. But what happens
when consensus cannot be reached or when some cases cannot be codified through IHL
provisions. International practice shows that ensuring compliance with IHL is not limited
to the implementation of the provisions of GCs and APs including Common Article 1.
Undoubtedly, in today's international society, states are required not only by treaty
obligations but also by customary obligations to comply with humanitarian legal rules
which I describe in the following section.
Importance of the Martens Clause Coverage and military AI
Although AI in the military context is developing rapidly, what could play a pivotal
role in minimizing the conflicts and concerns resulting from this technology can be a near
consensus on regulation and how all aspects of militarized AI can be regulated under
international regulation. It is certainly true that, more often, some states do not agree with
a particular course of action. But if the vast majority come to the conclusion that the
advantages of such regulation are worth it compared to challenges, a near consensus can
result.
As articulated above, not all aspects of military AI technologies have been codified in
IHL. Although AI has not been explicitly regulated under IHL, states are obliged to conduct
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hostilities following the “principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience” according to the Martens Clause. The clause has been recognized as “a safety
net for humanity” by the ICRC121, and represents “the integration of moral considerations
into legal analysis.”122 It is a common feature of IHL and disarmament treaties that strives
to provide protection for civilians and combatants beyond codified law, in the “absence of
specific treaty law or an international agreement”123 on AI developments in AWS. The
Martens clause -which first appeared in the preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention124 and appears in virtually all subsequent IHL instruments. The humanity considerations are
express recognition of the important examples of the general principles of IHL. Numerous
IHL and disarmament treaties have addressed the provision of the Martens Clause. AP I,
as an example, specifies:
In cases not covered by Additional Protocol I or by other international agreements,
civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles
of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.125
The clause is also referenced in the preambles of conventions such as the 1980
Convention on Conventional Weapons (para. 5),126 and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (para.
8).127 Put in other words, the Martens Clause is recognized as a customary rule which could
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fill gaps in the rules governing warfare by the moral norms. Because completely
autonomous weapons are not particularly addressed by international law, this clause
applies to them.
However, the rapid development of AI in military technologies such as fully AWS with
an ability to select and engage targets without MHC results in violation of the Martens
Clause. As such states must urgently scrutinize these weapons closely through the lens of
this Clause. Ultimately, existing treaties govern weapons systems in broad terms, thus a
legal review of the weapons should take the Martens Clause into account. This would be a
useful start to approaching this issue, however, it is likely that even such measures will not
sufficiently address the problems resulting from new military AI technologies and other
steps are needed. I will describe these in the fifth chapter.
This Clause includes cases not dealt with by conventional humanitarian law. The moral
and ethical area of the Clause is seemingly connected with the regulation of the use of new
technologies. What makes it difficult is that as states are competing with one another to
achieve high-tech military AI, especially, in fully AWS, the risks are increasing at an
alarming rate. These risks will be exacerbated by the lack of MHC. Since algorithmic
weapons do not possess legal or ethical judgment and can even wrongly act (including as
defensive systems), so compliance with the principles of IHL is challenging. The ability of
Fully AWS in taking decisions based on algorithms makes it unable to respect human life
and dignity. With this respect, Mines Action Canada concluded that:
A human being will seek to justify her or her own decision before firing. AWS,
which could not have empathy, would not be capable of considering such
consequences. Deploying AWS in combat displays the belief that any human
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targeted in this way does not warrant the consideration of a live operator, thereby
robbing that human life of its right to dignity.128
Allowing such weapons to make decisions or determinations would be incompatible
with the principles of humanity as outlined in this Clause. Providing further evidence of
concerns of AWS, the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) through discussions under
the auspices of the CCW has sought to regulate the next class of militarized AI systems.
For example, discussions about LAWS have been held at the UN’s Convention on CCW
in the 2010s. Compliance with IHL, as well as ethical and security considerations, is a
fundamental criterion for determining whether military AI systems are acceptable. In
addition to considering IHL principles, and the Martens Clause as a central element of
discussions on AWS and LAWS, the importance of IHL coverage could be looked at
through CCW measures as well.
IHL Coverage with a glance at CCW achievements
In addition to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, the
CCW is a key instrument of IHL. The Convention builds upon customary international
rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, including the requirements to distinguish at all
times between civilians and combatants, and to prohibition the use of weapons that inflict
excessive injury or suffering on combatants.129

128

Erin Hunt & Piotr Dobrzynski, The Right to Dignity and Autonomous Weapons Systems (Human Rights
Watch, 2018), at 5, online: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/arms0818sp_web.pdf
129
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II, III, IV and V), 10
October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137 (entered into force 2 December 1983), supra note 36.

47

The CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in the field of AI systems has been one
of the most significant achievements at the multilateral level.130 However, states and nongovernmental experts contributing to the discussion on AWS at the CCW Convention do
not agree on how and to what degree existing IHL standards create constraints on the
development and use of AWS in certain critical respects. 131 Although several states
negotiated the CCW to restrict or outlaw specific types of weapons and states parties are
obliged to take legislative and other kinds of measures to ensure their compliance with this
convention,132 some countries including the U.S. at the GGE meeting on LAWS focused
on AWS benefits (as effective and useful) in making military actions more precise and
following IHL easier.
On the contrary, Canada is a country that supports the work of the Convention to
consider LAWS. It is against to use of specific weapons that affect civilians especially
about the implications of integrating AI developments into LAWS. 133 Under the CCW
convention, to which Canada is one of the signatory states, usage of specific types of
weapons is prohibited. However, the CCW convention does not expressly mention AI and
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automated systems. Generally, in response to the development of new technologies and
armed conflict scenarios, it strives to maintain flexibility, 134 and its principles seem to
apply to some sort of automated systems and surrounding AWS.135 But the indeterminacy
and the “failure of mechanisms resulted from the regulating AWS to account for the real
challenges that they pose,”136 especially for characteristic features of AI in military systems
with the likelihood of high humanitarian impacts in the foreseeable future, still remain to
be tackled.
One thing is clear; the use of AWS and military systems must hinge on compliance
with the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality. In times of armed conflict, AI in
military operations will change human interaction profoundly which intensifies the debates
on human intervention.
Debates on Human-Machine Interaction & IHL Principles
Militarized AI has the potential to change the nature of warfare by replacing humans
in military operations, enabling humans, or eliminating human’s control over military AI
systems. As some, in the presentation to the CCW Meeting, declared:
To allow machines to determine when and where to use force against humans is to
reduce those humans to objects; they are treated as mere targets. They become zeros
and ones in the digital scopes of weapons that are programmed in advance to release
force without the ability to consider whether there is no other way out, without a
sufficient level of deliberate human choice about the matter.137
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Others hold a view that “the military is on the cusp of a major technological
revolution, in which warfare is conducted by unmanned and increasingly autonomous
weapon systems.”138 As a consequence, the military application of AI through AWS
should have MHC which is argued as one of the mitigation risk measures.139 Since AI
can equip weapons with a high degree of unpredictability, it has glorified human
intervention. Even the proposal of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of
non-governmental organizations that monitors the countries' positions140 on banning
fully autonomous weapons, is to prohibit any use of lethal force by AWS without
meaningful human intervention, supervision, or control over the use of force. A broad
definition of the type and degree of human-machine interaction for IHL compliance is
not yet provided by IHL.
The prohibition of the use of lethal force by AWS should be achieved through an
international treaty, as well as through national laws to enshrine the principle of
MHC. 141 This campaign launched by Human Rights Watch and other NGOs 142 is
seeking to pre-emptively ban the development, production, and use of LAWS that
select and attack targets without any human intervention (it can also ensure compliance
with the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience of Martens
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Clause). Indeed, it is evident that without any MHC, decision-making by LAWS in an
armed conflict can hardly be made in compliance with IHL principles mainly because
machines or robots cannot make human-like decisions based on IHL principles
including distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
However, meaningful control is a subject that needs global debate, especially when
the number of emerging countries using military AI is increasing. Canada could play a
leading role as an international leader in developing its national policy on questions
relating to the emerging technology of LAWS based on Canada’s leadership on the
landmine issue and the Ottawa process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As noted
by Paul Hannon, Executive Director of Mines Action Canada: “Canadians are uniquely
positioned to take on a leadership role in efforts to ensure that humans always have
meaningful control over life and death decisions in conflict.”143
IHL principles in this regard, as argued by some, require “deliberate human judgments”
because machines cannot infer things necessary to decide on who is a civilian or a
combatant.144 Others take the view that CCW States Parties generally agree that weapon
systems and use of force must be under the “meaningful” or “effective human control”, as
well as “appropriate levels of human judgment.”145 Otherwise, the delegation of human
control to AI systems will be increased.146 This can frequently be a paradigm shift enabling
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these capabilities to transform the AI battlefield, which makes it nearly impossible to
determine the applicability of IHL. AI systems can be trained, but they can't be
programmed to cover every scenario, since there will be unanticipated situations that will
require the involvement of a human. The problem here is that even though it is essential to
preserve the principle of human control, this principle per se is not sufficient to resist all
potential risks of AI in armed conflict.
Moreover, according to some scholars,147 there is a possibility of excessive civilian
harm as AI cannot guarantee, by its nature, what will happen when encountering a new
situation. It happens when AI is uncertain of target identification or where its action can be
supported by opinio juris (on the legal application of force). When an armed attack or the
“use of force”148 between states happens, they may resort to applying weaponized AI, but
expecting AWS to reliably act in a discriminatory and proportionate manner is
questionable.149
One controversial debate is that AI in fully autonomous weapons does not have legal
and ethical judgment. Due to the proportionality principle of IHL, as described in the
previous chapter, commanders are required to determine whether the anticipated military
advantage in identifying targets for a particular attack outweighs expected civilian harm.
Making such decisions should be based on ethical (Martens Clause) as well as legal
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considerations. Weapons with fully autonomy could not be preprogrammed to make such
an assessment.
Hence, the capability of AI to partially or completely eliminate human interventions in
military warfare should be highlighted. The utilization of a new generation of advanced AI
in military systems and AWS that are capable of identifying and destroying targets without
human intervention will pose fundamental legal concerns. Looking broader, the probability
of delegation of human control to AI military systems is increasing, and in the long term,
transforming military AI power and warfare amplifies states’ thirst to be dominant leaders
which can undermine the current coverage of IHL rules. For the inclination of states toward
military superiority, this global arms race has already begun with a quest for dominance in
militarized AI technologies. 150 Such an arms race carries less respect for IHL and its
fundamental rules, in particular when the widespread availability of arms can endanger
civilians as the typical victims who are entitled to be under the protection of IHL.
In addition to this legal concern, further assumptions in the case of AI military use may
be overlooked. There are some attitudes under the “trust” 151 domain varying from the
effects of AWS on individuals they are supposed to help, to how users and militaries will
trust these systems sufficiently to use them in combat. AI capabilities in learning, planning,
and generating complex plans would likely make matters worse for militaries to establish
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trust with AI weapons systems in the near future. To trust AWS and LAWS, it should be
first determined that they are sufficiently knowledgeable about the surrounding
environment in which they are applied and the context in which they are used to justify
their operations. Recognition of human control over critical functions of military AI
systems based on the associated risks seems necessary to many countries.
Adding to these concerns, the need for action against the use of new classes of weapons
is urgent. However, looking at new military AI technologies and existing rules, as
mentioned previously, shows that legal norms will likely lose their impact on the nextgeneration weapons that are not specifically regulated under IHL. Both national and
international initiatives are required in order to create a comprehensive regulatory approach
to emerging AI technologies to be compliant with IHL.
Unfortunately, international competition as mentioned in the previous chapter reduces
the possibility of conclusive regulation. So several ideas including the idea of a new
treaty152 (such as a binding international treaty on banning the development of weaponized
AI) proposed by some scholars, 153 or negotiating a new legally binding instrument on
autonomous weapons suggested by the ICRC,154 may not be supported by countries with
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advanced military AI technologies. Therefore, both national and international legal systems
might aim for soft law as a deterrent force rather than hard law. Most notably, this is a real
challenge that exists in the policies of states on both national and international stages and
needs a real effort to decrease the gaps between rhetoric and practice. The following
chapter will focus on national pathways on military AI by analyzing the national AI
strategy of Canada and the way it could reflect international principles in its policy to find
out what steps toward removing the gaps between rhetoric and practice have been taken or
should be taken by this country.
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CHAPTER 4
NATIONAL PATHWAYS ON MILITARY AI: THE IMPORTANCE OF
TRANSPARENT NATIONAL STRATEGIES

The propensity of military powers toward the deployment of AI programs adds urgency
to the need to regulate this technology under the principles of International Law. This
chapter considers national strategies and measures that states like Canada could devise and
employ when developing military AI to ensure respect for IHL principles.
In general, the existence of a perceived legal vacuum or uncertain landscape of legal
principles, on a national level regarding the military use of AI, indicates the necessity of
more study on compliance with IHL. On the national level, approaches regarding AI
development and its regulation vary widely, depending on the state. Some countries have
expressed their desire to impose limits on fully autonomous weapons. While some voices
are calling for a more cautious approach, such as a new treaty, others, including many
NGOs, suggest that a more incremental approach under existing international rules should
remain, in order to maintain meaningful human control on any use of AI weapons. The
inclination from only a few countries toward new legislation on banning AWS
development could reflect the reluctance of more dominant states on militarized AI to reach
a consensus on such a unified treaty. Some states are arguing for new legislation, others
tend to promote the use of soft law155 and guidelines rather than rely on binding legal
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principles. UN General Assembly Resolutions,156 official declarations, guidelines adopted
by international organizations and advisory opinions by international courts are examples
of non-binding instruments and soft law which could exert an influence on IHL principles.
Conceivably, states can strengthen their domestic legislation related to the implementation
of IHL by systematically integrating these soft law sources.
On the one hand, at a national level, developing guiding principles for the ethical, legal,
and secure use of AWS and LAWS is the first step for states to take. On the other hand,
the importance of finding a more workable legal theme on militarized AI needs to be
highlighted as the next step. This study endeavors to investigate the latter by having a
glance at Canadian insights and bringing in a comparative example of the U.S.
A Canadian Perspective on the International Stage
The significant role of AI in military applications has fostered international and
national legislators’ awareness. Addressing AI’s risks and comparing domestic legal
systems is necessary for finding the best framework to keep pace with this technology. A
prerequisite of embracing AI’s full potential should be meeting legal and ethical
requirements. As such, it is incumbent on legal scholars to investigate the progress and
strategies of countries on AI nationally and internationally. In this thesis, I elaborate on
both national policy or international measures taken by Canada and the U.S., as well as
challenges of militarized AI, and raise questions regarding their strategies. This comparison
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facilitates providing recommendations regarding the best ethical and legally applicable
policy on militarized AI for developing countries to take.
To commence with its measures on an international level, Canada has signed and
ratified all the major IHL conventions. It has also adopted domestic laws to implement
provisions of these conventions through instruments such as the Geneva Conventions
Acts.157 Under these treaties, and their implementing legislation, Canada is obligated to
take appropriate steps in accordance with IHL. One of the international measures taken by
Canada on military AI is the involvement of Canada at the Fifth Review Conference to the
CCW, in establishing an open-ended Group of GGE on AWS to explore “possible
recommendations on options for addressing Lethal AWS.”158 Besides that, at the GGE
meeting on LAWS in 2017, Canada stated that it is “committed to maintaining appropriate
human involvement in the use of military capabilities that can exert lethal force.” 159 To
recap, other examples of treaties that Canada has ratified are as follows:
-

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
an Armed Conflict (Canada is a State Party to Protocol to this convention);160
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-

Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Conventional Weapons;161 and

-

Three initial CCW protocols and later additions162 including, Protocol I on NonDetectable Fragments, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, Amended Protocol II, Protocol III on
Incendiary Weapons,163 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons,164 and Protocol
V on Explosive Remnants of War.165

In all aforementioned measures, the initial goal of Canada is to improve its compliance
with IHL obligations. To fulfill this requirement, Canada has so far taken different and
practical measures beyond signing treaties such as the adoption of the Joint Doctrine
Manual Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels. 166 A national
military manual is one of the aspects of the legal framework that governs the military's
operations. It establishes the framework within which commanders can make operational
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decisions in compliance with IHL when conducting operations. 167 Canada has military
manuals indicating respect for IHL and binding obligations not only upon the Government
or the Canadian Forces (CF). These manuals can serve as reference guides for legal
advisers as well as commanders. For instance, in Canada’s LOAC Manual (2001):
The obligations binding on Canada in accordance with Customary International
Law and Treaties to which Canada is a party are binding not only upon the
Government and the CF but also upon every individual. Members of the CF are
obliged to comply and ensure compliance with all International Treaties and
Customary International Law binding on Canada.168
Additionally, Canada’s Armed Forces Code of Conduct in 2001 states there is a
requirement to obey LOAC and CIL under Canadian military law which includes the
Criminal Code.169 Canada is committed to seeing that its forces conduct their operations in
compliance with the LOAC.170
To comply with existing specific treaties on IHL, Canada was the first state to sign and
ratify the Ottawa convention in 1997. This Treaty shows Canada’s leadership and its
cooperation with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which prohibits
military tactics using APLs. As a State Party to this convention, Canada has also adopted
the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention Implementation Act to implement the convention
and address its humanitarian objectives, 171 Canada is also one of the first countries that
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signed the CCW in 1981, demonstrating that it is against to use of specific types of weapons
that affect civilians indiscriminately.
Despite the considerable international measures taken by Canada, Canada needs
clarification in some aspects of its IHL approach on the international level to boost its
position. For example, while countries including Austria have called for a ban on weapons
that don’t have MHC over critical functions,172 Canada has not taken a specific position,
despite, among others, some members of the AI research community in Canada calling for
an International Ban on the Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence with an open letter.173
These experts urged the Prime Minister to urgently address the challenge of LAWS and to
take a leading position against AWS on the international stage at the CCW meetings in
Geneva. Taking a leading position and pursuing more transparent and explicit procedures
at the international stage would vividly illustrate the strength of Canada’s IHL leadership
on the world stage. Following a transparent domestic policy can also indicate how well a
country has been able to regulate its national law under international law and IHL
principles. The next section describes a current Canadian perspective on military AI at the
national level.
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A Canadian Perspective on the National Stage
When it comes to AI, Canada plays a leading role in all domains ranging from scientific
research, transportation, data, and digital infrastructure, information technology, ethics,
skills and education, space exploration, and so forth. AI seems to have touched different
aspects of AI policy in Canada’s strategies. Canada, in 2017, was the first country to release
a national strategy for AI.174 In fact, Canada has pursued various national strategies. For
example, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR, as a state-associate
institute) AI program,175 would enhance Canada’s international status as a leader in this
area. Enhancing Canada’s international profile and visibility in artificial intelligence is one
of the objectives of CIFAR’s Pan-Canadian AI Strategy. In its guidelines and national
strategy on AI, Canada is leading the way in the use of this technology.
As of November 2018, a report on national and regional AI strategies was published
by CIFAR that motivated other countries to advance their national AI strategies.176 In 1982,
CIFAR’s first research program focused on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and Society.
Two years later, the Canadian government asked CIFAR to develop and implement the
Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy. The Pan-Canadian AI Strategy “as a
significant investment is designed to advance research and innovation in AI bringing
thought leaders from around the world to examine the broad implications of AI.”177 CIFAR
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has a five-year plan to invest primarily in AI research, talent, and training with specific
objectives.178As a leader in releasing a national AI strategy, Canada aimed at using AI
ethically and positioning the country as a “thought leader”179 in different aspects of AI
implications namely the ethical, policy, and legal implications. 180 Developing thought
leadership on different implications of AI at the domestic level, including ethical
implications,181 Canada could prove that it can be one of the states in setting international
norms for different AI applications such as military use of AI as a critical application.
Although the CIFAR program does not include policies in strategic sectors such as the
military realm, Canada has other policies in place which are separate from the CIFAR
strategy, and a need for transparent AI use consistent with legal rules has been addressed
in the national policy of Canada. On March 4, 2019, the Treasury Board of Canada
Secretariat launched the Directive on Automated Decision Making to guide government
departments in the transparent and accountable use of AI. The Directive on Automated
Decision-Making of Canada182 is an attempt toward utilizing AI to be compatible with legal
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principles such as transparency, legality, and other procedural factors. It is said that this
Directive will evolve to ensure that it remains relevant.183 With the rapid change of AI
technology, the military realm would be one of the relevant parts that need to be covered
in these kinds of national activities. However, it is not clarified how this directive can
remain relevant. Another measure taken by Canada - more specifically- the government of
Quebec is the proposal for the creation of an intergovernmental organization184 dedicated
to fostering consensus among member states regarding the standards or practices governing
AI applications that should comprise some areas such as the military realm.
Furthering the Canadian national AI strategies which launched through several
measures such as enhancing the “Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy”185 would
provide other states with opportunities to make a move in their national strategies by
adopting a clear position on AI within the framework of IHL. Over the past years, a
growing number of countries have adopted national strategies seeking to develop policies
and procedures on the use of AI. For instance, China through its “Next Generation
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan”186 in July 2017, announced its aim to become
the world leader in this technology by 2030. These strategies on the national level
demonstrate that countries continue to invest in AI research. But they need to assess
different AI applications in multiple realms such as the military and its numerous
associated risks. The main significant risk arising from military AI and its consequences
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would be security. From the perspectives of state actors, the importance of security cannot
be denied. For example, in the Canadian Safety and Security Program, there are various
priorities taken into account. Among the priorities is improving Canada’s capability to
prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosive weapons. 187 This program should be developed because more
attention needs to be given to the military realm under the current national and international
regulations. Making efforts to consider advanced military AI in this program enables it to
address the legal concerns about military AI implications on safety and security as well.
Regardless of legal debates and repercussions, the ethical implications of AI have been
explored separately. To look at the ethical issues of developing human enhancement
technology in the military, a research project was conducted at Defence Research and
Development Canada (DRDC)

188

proposing both technology and military ethics

assessment frameworks to identify potential ethical issues with emerging technologies and
their use by militaries. Compliance with National Laws and Codes of Conduct, with jus in
bello and jus ad bellum principles, are among the categories where ethical questions could
arise with technology in use.189
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Pursuant to its obligations to implement IHL domestically, Canada established the
Canadian National Committee for Humanitarian Law (CNCHL) in 1998.

190

The

Committee, with several government departments and organizations, has major functions,
namely recommending the ratification of IHL-related legal instruments, coordinating the
implementation of IHL obligations, advising on IHL dissemination and training in Canada,
stimulating the actions of governmental and other relevant organizations to strengthen
compliance with IHL, suggesting measures to promote the national implementation of IHL
in domestic legislation in other countries, based on Canada's resources or expertise, and so
forth.191
In accordance with IHL, Canada same as other governments, is required to ensure
respect for IHL, educate its armed forces and the general public, and enact laws punishing
violations of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols.192 To the Canadian Red
Cross, disseminating the principles of IHL to the armed forces, lawmakers, politicians, and
the general public raises awareness which frequently means more respect from militaries
as they would receive training on IHL, know the rules and follow them. Respecting IHL is
of utmost importance in the Canadian perspective to the extent that even on a domestic
level breaching IHL principles would be punishable by Canadian Criminal Law. Basically,
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as long as AI is applied in autonomous weapons, the military application of this technology
could pave the way for widespread violations of IHL. As such, governments must bear
responsibility for any potential violations of IHL to ensure respect. States must pass
legislation to punish breaches of IHL including the GCs and APs.193
Moreover, Canada has evidently been active on the national front on AI regulation,
leading the way in the responsible use of AI 194 with its initiatives through national
strategies and guidelines to ensure the safe adoption, secure military AI applications, and
promote the responsible use of this technology by states based on IHL principles and
common values. The consequences of domestic strategies applied and taken by Canada on
an international level cannot be overestimated. Canada has focused on AI technology and
innovation, and it is taking steps in harnessing the potential of AI, as well as examining the
legal and ethical implications of AI. As IHL lies at the core of Canada’s commitment to a
peaceful world,195 becoming an international leader as well as applying the most clarified
national perspective can be the measures toward “peaceful use of AI” 196 which can be taken
by Canada on both national and international fronts.
Another measure taken by Canada in its national policy is the Government of Canada’s
Defence Policy Document entitled: Strong, Secure, Engaged. In this document, Canada
declared its “commitment to maintaining appropriate human involvement in the use of
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military capabilities that can exert lethal force”197 while pointing out that technological
developments are the future of defense. Additionally, this document indicates “Canada is
committed to employing new technological capabilities in a manner that rigorously
respects all applicable domestic and international law, is subject to proven checks and
balances, and ensures full oversight and accountability.”198 This new Canadian approach
to defence is comprised of three requirements:
1- Anticipate: understanding potential threats to Canada and Canadian interests so
as to enhance the military’s ability and Canadian Armed Forces 199 (CAF) to
succeed on operations, to prevent or prepare for, and respond to a wide range of
contingencies;
2- Adapt: proactively to emerging challenges by harnessing new technologies;
3- Act: with the decisive military capability to defend Canada, protect Canadian
interests and values contributing to global stability.200
Elaborating these requirements reveals the Canadian perspective on the importance of
the challenges emanating from technologies with dual-use, including AI military in the
near future. It can be argued that the absence of any mention of AI in Strong, Secure,
Engaged is the failure of the Canadian Armed Forces to exploit Canada’s advanced AI
capabilities. However, there is no doubt that AI is a part of this document, if only obliquely.
Authors note that Canada lacks sufficient investment in military technology.201 If this
is the case, it may be part of the reason why AI is not being directly addressed in our laws
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and policies yet. However, a lack of investment in the technology should not preclude
adopting a comprehensive legal and policy approach. But the question is how can it be
done? I will return to this question after examining international and national strategies in
the next chapter in order to inform possible recommendations.
There is no doubt that Canada has recognized that new means of technology could bring
fundamental challenges. These challenges should be addressed head-on in the proactive
development of new measures and policies. Critics have pointed out the urgent need of
“taking a strong and leading position against AWS on the international stage addressing
the challenge of LAWS.”202 Taking a strong position is a high priority especially when the
rapid evolution of military AI technology leads to increasing levels of AWS. While Strong,
Secure, Engaged deliberately identifies the possibility of lethal operation of military
technologies,203 the importance of civilian protection and providing a framework to select
any target has been regarded in several subjects of Canadian directives such as the targeting
process.204
Given the increase in the development of new methods of military AI, Canada has
aspired to respond to resulting threats to national and international law. The CAF, as an
example, is aiming to ensure that the use of military capabilities is consistent with domestic
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and international legal principles. The CAF is committed to maintaining appropriate human
involvement in the use of military capabilities that can exert lethal force.205 To maintain
the lead, however, the growing military applications of AI developments, in particular, the
autonomy of weapons systems, needs additional attention in Canadian policy making. In
Canada’s defence policy, military capabilities with lethal force are referred to as
autonomous weapons systems but mentioned only once in this document. When this
document raises the idea of maintaining appropriate human involvement in the use of
military capabilities, the strength is that as humans are ultimately responsible or
accountable for lethal decisions, human involvement has been considered critical to that
process by Canada. Additionally, in the use of force, Canada ensures the appropriate human
involvement through its national legal review of all weapons systems, which ensures the
weapons systems are compliant with Canada's international legal obligations.206 As such,
it is clarified in which cases human involvement is necessary. However, the absence of a
definition of human involvement can be considered a weakness. Canada needs to define
such expression, or state to what extent human involvement is necessary.
Specific areas of concern such as discussions on LAWS at CCW need to be conducted
consistently, and maintaining appropriate human involvement on LAWS should be
explicitly clarified.
Canada supports a prohibition of weapon systems based on innovative technologies
that are not consistent with IHL and ensuring accountability for their use. Considering
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Canada’s response to potential consensus recommendations on emerging technologies in
the area of LAWS, 207 it is supportive of exploring the potential challenges posed by
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS to IHL. But as mentioned earlier, it is not
supportive of a ban on LAWS. Rather it has stated that appropriate human involvement
must be maintained on LAWS in the use of force.
There may be some reasons why Canada has not been able to adequately address
militarized AI employing AWS and LAWS. In part, Canada's inability to adequately
address military deployments of AWS and LAWS is caused by the fact that it has not
distinguished their use across different fields.
When the Canadian Armed Forces explicitly accept that it is committed to maintaining
appropriate human involvement in the use of military capabilities that can exert lethal
force, it somehow implies that these weapons might be used in contexts such as defence
and security but with appropriate human involvement. Attempting to implicitly separate
security and defence concerns from other AI concerns might ignore the dual and multi-use
nature of AI technology and the reality that certain risks are involved with its use in
different contexts. The major reason why Canada has not distinguished between the use of
AI in the military across different fields is the lack of definition on AWS and LAWS,
nationally and internationally, which can result in a range of possible working definitions.
For example, in some cases, drones (as remote-controlled weapons systems) may be
considered autonomous lethal weapon systems, while in other cases, semi-autonomous
weapons may fall under this category. As a result, by offering a component definition or a
more thorough classification to prevent possible risks that are difficult to regulate under
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current IHL rules, Canada should address the usage of AI technology in areas of concern
in a sufficient manner.
Last but not least, given the impressive and productive AI strategies of Canada on the
national stage, taking an internationally leading position could transform the Canadian
perspective into the practicable and transparent example that can be borrowed emerging
countries on military AI nationally and internationally. This step can be taken through
sufficiently addressing the grey areas. This would reinforce the reputation of Canada as an
international leader in advanced AI, one considering the broader legal, ethical, and social
implications.
In the next section, I will discuss some activities of the U.S. as this country has followed
distinct strategies on the national stage regarding military technology and its compliance
with IHL. Taking a comparative outlook to Canada’s policies may highlight strengths and
weaknesses and suggest an appropriate course of action for others. National
implementation -the process of implementing international obligations at the domestic
level- is critical to ensure full compliance with IHL. As such it is important to review some
measures of the U.S. on the international stage first.
An American Perspective on the International Stage
The United States has developed military AI technology by investing heavily in the
field of intelligent autonomous weapons. Such ambitions could ensure the continued
centrality of AI in the future of military cutting-edge technologies.
As noted earlier, IHL treaties including the four GCs of 1949 have been widely
accepted by states around the world. The United States has signed and ratified the four
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1949 GCs in 1955 and Protocol III of 2005 in 2007.208 The U.S. has signed AP I and AP II
of 1977, though it has yet to ratify and become a State Party to those additional protocols.
As a non-party to AP I, it is not strictly speaking bound by the obligation of Article 36.
Despite the U.S. not having ratified Additional Protocols I and II, it has implemented
the customary legal obligation to review new weapons in a matter which accords with
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I. For example, the U.S. DoD has a policy that requires
a legal review of weapons and weapon systems to ensure the consistency of development,
acquisition, the use of such weapons and weapon systems with all applicable U.S. domestic
law, international law, CIL, and the international legal obligations of the U.S., including
the law of war and arms control obligations.209
The U.S. has also codified many of the provisions contained in APs I and II through
domestic legislative action. For instance, the War Crimes Act of 1996 210 as amended211,
imposes criminal penalties for breaches of the 1949 GCs, including violations of Common
Article 3. 212 On top of that, to promote respect for IHL and enhance humanitarian
protections during armed conflict, the U.S. Government ratified other treaties namely:
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-

The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
an Armed Conflict

213

(the U.S. is not a State Party to Protocol to this

Convention),214
-

Amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on Conventional Weapons,215 and;

-

Three initial CCW protocols and later additions.216

The U.S. is not a party to specific agreements that prohibit the use of certain weapons
such as the Ottawa Treaty. This country supported the development process of the treaty,
but it did not sign it in 1997. However, IHL has been and remains a vital guide for military
operations conducted by the U.S. To fulfill this requirement, the U.S. like Canada has so
far taken different measures such as the adoption of manuals to facilitate dissemination of
IHL, also to contribute to the awareness of issues relevant to IHL and its rules applicable
in armed conflicts.
It can be said that the detail of all IHL rules and treaties cannot be captured in military
manuals, but these manuals are able to provide related information in different aspects for
implementing IHL such as the U.S. Field Manual in 1956, Air Force Pamphlet (1976),
Operational Law Handbook (1993), Manual for Military Commissions (2007) and so
forth.217 To take the DoD Law of War Manual as an example, it provides information to
DoD personnel responsible for executing military operations and implementing the law of
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war. The focus of this Manual is on the law governing the conduct of hostilities and the
protection of war victims while noting the IHL (treaties and CIL) that applies to the U.S.218
In general, when states are becoming more aware of the relevance of IHL, more explicit
actions on an international level are demanded. In addition to international measures, the
next section discusses several steps in the national AI strategy of the U.S. that have been
taken.
An American Perspective on the National Stage
All states are responsible to develop their national AI policies and laws for military
applications. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, several
countries known to be developing weapon systems with various autonomous features
include China, Russia, and the United States.219 The U.S. has already cited autonomous
technologies as a cornerstone of its strategic capabilities and military plans. For instance,
the 2014 U.S Defense Innovation Initiative emphasizes the importance of technological
autonomy advances for the U.S. military to maintain its advantages over adversaries. 220
Military and Intelligence matters fall under different authorities of the U.S. Code.221
Under Title 10 of the U.S Code, the role of armed forces in the United States Code is
outlined providing the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of each of the
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services as well as the DoD that is as an executive branch department of the federal
government. As AI generates ethical and legal questions, DoD is constrained by its
authority under this Code, and the U.S. Constitution, as well as other statutory regulations.
Alongside these general provisions, the 2018 “Department of Defense Artificial
Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity”222 shows
that this country developed its national policy on AWS which can also be found in the DoD
Directives described below.
The U.S military has been leading the development of autonomy in a range of
applications. In “Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the
Department of Defense”, besides the importance of prioritizing AI ethics, existing DoD
ethics frameworks, and values, there is an appendix on the law of war that should be taken
into account. Appendix III 223 states that existing legal rules apply to the use of new AI
technologies in armed conflict.
The DoD provides the military forces needed to “deter war and to protect the national
security of the United States.”224 This department has confirmed that “the acquisition and
procurement of weapon systems shall be consistent with all applicable domestic law,
treaties and international agreements, customary international law, and the law of armed
conflict.”225 Moreover, the DoD Directive 3000.09 has recognized the appropriate levels
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of human judgment over weapons systems and the use of force. However, in a 2020
Congressional Research Service report:
This judgment does not require manual human control of the weapon system, but
rather broader human involvement in decisions about how, when, where, and why
the weapon will be employed. This includes a human determination that the weapon
will be used with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable
treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement.226
There is an obvious deficiency in this directive which is about a consensus or clarification
on how, when, and where human control should be applied, and what exactly human
control means. Regarding the role of the human operator, maintaining human involvement
is a core concern for actors seeking to regulate AI weapons systems. The U.S. DoD policy
indicates the appropriate level of human judgment standard stating: “autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to
exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”227

The directive further establishes that the employment of LAWS must be under
appropriate legal rules. It explains that authorizing the use of or operating autonomous and
semi-autonomous weapon systems must be done in accordance with the law of war,
applicable treaties, applicable rules of engagement (ROE), and weapon system safety
rules.228
The concern is about ambiguity in U.S. commitments. The way that some legal words
have been chosen and the extent they can apply in new circumstances is not clear. Notably,
the word “appropriate” is regarded as a flexible term in the 2018 U.S. government white
paper submitted to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts:
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Appropriate is a flexible term that reflects the fact that there is not a fixed, one sizefits-all level of human judgment that should be applied to every context. What is
“appropriate” can differ across weapon systems, domains of warfare, types of
warfare, operational contexts, and even across different functions in a weapon
system. Some functions might be better performed by a computer than a human
being, while other functions should be performed by humans.229
However, it is suggested that the DoD can be cautious in adopting AI for military
applications and inform the U.S. public on the need for military AI capabilities to ensure
their employment ethically. 230 In 2017, the DoD began to implement the Third Offset
Strategy, and LAWS are an element of this strategy. It involves the active development of
next-generation technologies, and their use in future military initiatives. This initiative is
aimed at developing cutting-edge technologies by focusing on fields such as robotics,
autonomous systems, and so forth.231
Military application of AI and its integration into the battlefield has been assessed by
other U.S. organizations. For instance, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) is a
subdivision of the United States Armed Forces and the DoD’s Artificial Intelligence Center
on exploring the usage of Artificial Intelligence and integrating AI technologies into
battlefield roles. It is created to help DoD components enhance the ability to execute new
AI initiatives.232 Making transparency a top priority in navigating ethical questions by the
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JAIC, and following predictable and transparent measures, “will ultimately lead to
healthier development programs and the creation of norms and standards around the use of
military AI.”233
Although in other policies of the U.S. it is said that “authorizing a machine to make
lethal combat decisions is contingent upon political and military leaders, resolving legal
and ethical questions...,” 234 ethical and legal debates about military applications of AI
remain in this country. What results from the U.S. national activities is that the
development or employment of LAWS is not prohibited in U.S. policy. Therefore,
discussions will remain on the topic that the U.S. is developing such weapons. Developing
military weapons undoubtedly increases legal and ethical concerns.
In sum, looking at the Canadian and American approaches, it seems the current
international legal principles, and national strategies have not sufficiently covered the
employment of new military AI in armed conflict.
As mentioned previously, a growing number of states and organizations are appealing
for the regulation of new AI military technologies due to ethical and legal repercussions.
Frequently, the implication of AI in AWS and the possibility of an AI arms race support
understanding of different regulatory regimes, their benefits, and drawbacks.235 When AI
employs in warfare, the negative consequences cannot be overestimated. This is why the
importance of understanding different regulatory regimes to achieve comprehensive
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regulatory frameworks has become more evident than ever. There is an urgent need for the
most practicable legal framework to govern the upcoming military AI, as well as a need to
clarify definitions of AWS and LAWS or adopt specific definitions considering the new
generation of AI.
The use of AI in AWS and LAWS will receive more pushback as more military ethics,
safety, and security issues emanate from, and different perspectives are taken on military
AI systems and their regulation. The first example is HRW that, as noted earlier, has been
calling for banning AWS under an international agreement. The next example is the 2018
resolution by the European Parliament on banning LAWS in which the European
Commission, individual member states, and the European Council are urged to “work
towards the start of international negotiations on a legally binding instrument prohibiting
lethal autonomous weapon systems.”236 One of the arguments is that most countries in
favor of banning LAWS are those with less likelihood of attending international
disarmament talks or they are most at risk from this technology.237
On the contrary, some countries are not seeking to prohibit LAWS completely. To take
China as an example, it states that its call is to ban the use of fully autonomous weapons,
but not their development or production.238 China has mentioned the need for a ban on
offensive weapons. It, however, inclines toward having a defensive autonomous system,
so its position should be clarified. The U.S. is another example where the government
neither supports the proposal for a ban on LAWS nor supports negotiating a new treaty on
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fully autonomous weapons or on their prohibition. From the future perspective, this
opposition is likely to include new methods and means of military AI.
The U.S. has explicitly pushed back against the call for regulation of these systems
through banning. In March 2018, it has addressed ethical concerns in a white paper entitled:
“Humanitarian Benefits of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous
Weapons” that notes the more accurate function of weapons with less risk of civilian
damage. The question raised is how accurate function could be guaranteed? Or how the
reliance on fully autonomous weapons should be limited? Compounding the divide
between the viewpoints by those who argue in favor of this technology and those who warn
of an unpredictable future of technology in which humanity has extirpated from war is
ongoing ambiguity regarding the nature of autonomy, and specifically, a lack of consensus
over the necessary degree of autonomy.239
As a consequence, the employment of AWS, LAWS, or any other means or methods
of AI technologies that merge into military applications will be accompanied by numerous
repercussions. Needless to say, ethical and legal concerns of military AI will draw more
attention from the viewpoint of national policies and international regulation as more issues
receive national and international discussion, clarification, and exploration:
Apart from definitions of new means or methods of military AI technologies, there are
questions regarding the appropriate and preventive legal measures that countries should
have taken. The other discussion is that in case of human intervention or control over AI
military systems, how can this intervention be guaranteed? This issue needs clarification
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especially when there is an apparent human error or an unintentional act while applying
militarized AI on how offenders can be held accountable or responsible for violations of
IHL. States can establish new rules on autonomous weapon systems to not only preserve
the legal and moral responsibilities of those conducting hostilities but also effectively
increase protections for civilians and those harmed by armed conflict.
In this regard, the Group of Governmental Experts adopted 11 guiding principles in
2019. A set of autonomous weapons principles developed by the GGE recognizes IHL
application to all new technologies. One of these principles accepts the non-delegation of
human responsibility by clarifying that human responsibility for decisions on the use of
weapons systems has been retained since accountability cannot be transferred to
machines. 240 Putting AI systems in charge of life-or-death decisions throws up the
possibility of detrimental outcomes. That is why humans must remain responsible for major
decisions. However, the concerns are still there in terms of how countries will guarantee
this rule. Human responsibility should be ensured through human-machine interaction, but
it needs to be clarified how this should be done. The guiding principles could be
operationalized at the national level, by being taken into account in the implementation of
national law. The principles may contribute to an IHL compliant development, and use of
emerging LAWS technologies.241
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The ability of AI to advance with multi-use poses a wide range of problems for the
body of international law. Ultimately, it seems new means and methods of warfare are not
able to meet all the current IHL requirements and rules and there is a need for developing
more comprehensive principles. But under what kind of comprehensive principles military
should AI be regulated and how can pragmatic ones be explored?
To respond to these questions, it should be generally said that IHL as an applicable
legal framework on situations of armed conflicts needs revision. Studying national and
international pathways demonstrates the inadequacy of measures taken to date.
Specifically, inadequacies on emerging technologies that might be neglected from
countries, where an idea about multilateral approaches comes on the scene. To regulate
these technologies adequately, this study proposes multilateral approaches to take in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDED MULTILATERAL APPROACHES

A growing number of military operations are anticipated to be carried out by AW
systems in the future. Since 2014, several international discussions have taken place on
AWS, but new legal approaches to regulating AI-enabled military applications that support
weapon systems have not been devised. What is clear here is that the law on AWS lacks
clarity and that there is a need to design a new approach to this and other emerging
technologies. Through this, not only will the potential benefits of AI technologies in the
military be fostered, but also new military aspects of this technology could be regulated
under international principles.
This study proposes multilateral approaches at the international and national levels.
Multilateral approaches will help to shape national policy; transparency and confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) can exert a profound influence in eradicating future legal
challenges. Preventing or reducing ambiguities in peaceful activities, as well as
strengthening international cooperation are among CBMs goals. It has been stated that
CBMs can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, depending on the specific context in
which they are applied.242
At the 2018 GGE meeting, Canada was supportive of developing key Transparency
and CBMs and looked forward to exploring these and other such ideas. 243 To take article
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36 of Additional Protocol I as an example, if states apply the transparent code of conduct
through confidence-building measures, other countries will be assured that they are
committed to international law compliance as well as peaceful AI use. Peaceful AI use will
be a central touchpoint in international relations. States not only need to voice their support
for the principle of peaceful uses of AI technology in their policies, but they must commit
to this principle unambiguously, at the highest levels. For the benefit of humanity, all states,
particularly great powers, need to support the notion that AI in military systems should be
developed based on ethical, legal, and humane principles.
On the one hand, CBMs in the field of arms control are voluntary measures designed
to prevent hostilities, reduce military tension, build mutual trust between countries or
communities, and enhance international cooperation. On the other hand, applying a code
of conduct through CBMs could help reduce the risk of militarized AI conflicts. This is
mainly because Codes of Conduct, compared to multilateral conventions, are more flexible
and more capable of adapting to AI technological advances than binding treaties. Whereas
codes of conduct are not internationally binding but rather offer short-term solutions
nationally, to reach a multilateral approach and solutions, international principles along
with authorized organizations governing the secure military application of AI should be
developed.
Secondly, international cooperation and AI powers’ assistance to emerging states can
limit the future widespread legal concerns of AI military activities under IHL.
Contemplating international cooperation, Canada, in its policy is seeking to “exchange
views on regional security issues and threats to regional stability by establishing strategic
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dialogues with key regional powers.” 244 Since this measure increases the international
confidence-building in AI weapons, it paves the way for states to determine what is the
most effective practice to follow.
Additionally, states should elaborate their views and deepen discussions to secure and
enhance respect for IHL in the development and use of AWS. With regard to future military
actions, the use of new kinds of AI technological developments in weapons systems raises
questions concerning the implementation of IHL. Still, clarification is needed about what
or how particular types of human intervention may be warranted under IHL. These
discussions should aim more broadly to develop norms by practicing as well as interpreting
IHL obligations on new military AI activities of states.
The development of new military AI technologies requires more guidelines, effective
national approaches, and constant meaningful international dialogue among states to be
capable of meeting international standards. States have much to gain from supporting
greater transparency on Article 36 (AP I) review procedures and cooperation on dealing
with the challenges posed by emerging technologies. Sharing information enables
transparency by creating a transparent environment for states which, in turn, helps enable
trust between them. Strategically speaking, however, observers point out that some states
are reluctant to share or reveal information about what is or what is not in their toolbox.245
Information sharing is even required by IHL to ensure the application of the GCs and
AP I.246 States should share information and their perspectives on practical measures to
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enhance respect for IHL while the development and application of military AI systems are
increasing. Forming a clear correlation between international law (the applicable treaties)
and national law (codes, judicial decisions, legislation) would be frequently required to
ensure respect for and the application of IHL regulations. Legislation might be enacted to
incorporate more comprehensive provisions for humanitarian law enforcement and the
punishment of offenders. A clear example as mentioned earlier is when breaching IHL
principles would be punishable under Canadian criminal law.
Further, legal and technical co-operation and communication between countries has
been highlighted as central to building new AI applications.247 International cooperation is
able to provide a wide variety of opportunities for states to exchange information at an
international level about their national AI strategies, making discussions and normative
frameworks about legal concerns resulting from militarized AI. These frameworks in both
domestic and international settings must be collaborative.
The initial point in international cooperation can be mutual trust, which seems
achievable through measures like adopting the relevant legal instruments, the commitment
to or being a contracting state to treaties such as the Convention on CCW that was adopted
in 1980, specific treaties like the Ottawa Convention, the GCs and the APs. Regarding
international cooperation, on June 7, 2018, the governments of Canada and France released
a joint statement on AI that called for creating an international study group as a global point
of reference to understand and share research results on AI issues and best practices.
Canada and France “wish to promote a vision of human-centric artificial intelligence
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grounded in human rights, inclusion, diversity, innovation, and economic growth.” 248
Canada is also supportive of the sharing of good practices in the area of weapons reviews
as well as the sharing of case studies for existing weapons.249
Investigating national perspectives focuses on peaceful AI use, which can be reflected
in how their practices conform with international legal rules, transparency, and confidencebuilding measures. Since the technology-specific consequences will be inevitably bound
to arise, different regulatory and legislative actions are required. The first revolutionized
process should occur in the domestic setting. In this process, the dual-use of AI technology
will challenge states to interpret legal norms in regulating military AI innovation. For
example, the IHL principle of Humanity that includes protections for the civilian
population, assists practitioners in properly interpreting and applying specific IHL rules
that are based on humanitarian considerations. Domestic regulators and legislatures will
first need to ensure that they effectively prevent the use or development of AI technology
in new weapons, especially when new weapons cannot be used or developed complying
with the principle of IHL.
Certain uses of revolutionary AI inevitably confront us with unpredictable situations,
accelerating conflicts. This issue provides a starting point for more robust discussions on
the national and international levels among countries making efforts to mitigate the legal
concerns of the misapplication of military AI. At a national level, generating an appropriate
legally binding framework and set of principles are primary steps for states to take in
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ensuring compliance with the principles of IHL in AI development. Setting up an
independent regulatory organization for states, especially for emerging countries where the
reliance on military AI is increasing, would guarantee the application of national rules in
compliance with international legal rules.
Such regulatory organization(s) could be responsible for IHL and other international
legal norms in close cooperation with relevant international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations. This organization would be an
effective step, especially for emerging countries to take transparent national AI strategies
under IHL. One of the main objectives of this organization would be humanitarian
disarmament to reduce civilian harm as a result of armed conflict involving AI. Another
objective should be to evaluate the risks associated with different AI systems and identify
those that require further legal assessment and review. Also, the aforementioned
organization can be an authorized entity to regulate and evaluate new means and methods
of warfare using AI under the new classification.
The new proposed organization, must closely follow military AI developments and
verify their compliance with IHL or other international legal norms and assess their
humanitarian impacts. It shall seek to ensure security through diverse perspectives. For
example, it could require that new military AI technologies remain under human control
while assisting in situations needing decision-making. It would be essential for the
organization to determine where, when, how and to what extent human control over
military AI activities should be guaranteed or exercised. The organization can likely bear
the authority to restrict states in militarized AI activities or prohibit military AI operations
if it is proved the operation would endanger IHL principles and transparent national
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strategies, especially when “a state fails to protect its population”250 based on responsibility
to protect (R2P) doctrine.251 Failure to protect the population even can happen when states
AI targets kill their own soldiers and civilians, intentional or unintentional while applying
militarized AI (so-called “friendly fire”).
By regulating the states’ activities, the new organization would make them active rather
than inactive or reactive.252 Considering the dual-use nature of AI technologies, this new
organization could follow a dual application. If military activities of states lead to
intentional or unintentional and expected or unexpected harm to civilians, it should restrict
or limit those activities regardless of the international position taken by that state. This
organization can also be a platform for developing international accountability
mechanisms, and Canada could support its establishment to assist in the restriction of
emerging technologies and in the investigation of those responsible for wrongful acts.
Weapons that are not accompanied by either responsibility or accountability of human
beings provide a significant challenge in adhering to IHL rules. At the same time, in light
of AI’s capability to assist in making decisions, for example, by offering guidance for
making rational decisions, some advocates hold a view that “military personnel could use
it in a battlespace, to help make more informed and more rapid decisions than if the data
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were processed manually.” 253 Essentially, given the alarming stakes involved in the
military realm, widespread AI’s use must be closely scrutinized.
Reliability is connected to transparency as the key component of building trust among
countries. Consequently, there is a need for national strategies and policies to keep pace
with the scientific developments to regulate this technology for military purposes. The
comprehensive regulation and greater adherence to IHL can help mitigate potential issues
such as civilian harm when AI warfare occurs, particularly when demands to achieve
military AI are increasing among countries. If national approaches could be based on
international laws trying to bridge the gaps, it will provide an opportunity for states to
create normative rules that are consistent with their national policies and security. IHL can
be impacted in part by the development of normative guidelines and nonbinding normative
instruments because they can provide legal obligations and may even be considered a form
of evidence of state practice or opinio juris. This measure could be more effective than a
new treaty, as a new treaty might not be able to change the situation regarding vast areas
of AI technologies in a timely manner. However, even in a new treaty like the Ottawa
Convention, we can learn from this Convention by further clarifying the applicability of
IHL to the wide realm of AI technological developments. Last but not least, I would like
to go back to the key theme inspiring my contribution: an examination of the Canadian
perspective on military uses of AI under IHL to point out that if Canada adopts a more
transparent and comprehensive approach, this could be a practicable example for emerging
states.
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Engaging in AI policy manifests Canada’s commitment to prioritizing transparent
military use of AI under IHL principles. The AI approach of Canada is not a self-regulated
one but it has introduced AI policies within the framework of IHL. Canada is taking steps
toward developing a comprehensive framework to regulate military AI to make it
consistent with international legal norms. However, Canada does not adequately address
controversial military technologies such as the regulation of LAWS. There has not been
much written about the explicit position of Canada on the regulation of new AI military
advances. Admittedly, all countries have given inadequate attention to this matter.
Accordingly, there is great room for discussions of the law governing new means and
methods of warfare under IHL.
When Canada demonstrates its commitment through several measures (including
ratifying conventions, engaging in international cooperation, building trust, adopting a
transparent national AI strategy, and so on), then it can provide leadership in developing
international law in this area. Canada’s approach could provide leadership for emerging
countries and AI powers alike.
Canada’s commitment at UN discussions in maintaining appropriate human
involvement in military AI applications underscores the importance of taking a specific
strategy on AWS and LAWS. Canada still needs to define what appropriate human
involvement is, to what extent it is needed, and how it can be achieved, and not just follow
a general strategy on maintaining appropriate human involvement in military AI. That, in
turn, may be accompanied by several activities to clarify its international policy
sufficiently.
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First and foremost, broader implications beyond the national perspective are required.
Canada has supported a call to multilateral talks on LAWS, but it should increase its
presence in international discussions on fully AWS and new methods of warfare, not just
as a participant or supportive of broad-ranging consensus recommendations, but as an actor
state to show its leadership. In this regard, a senior researcher at a Canadian peace research
institute has suggested that developing the national policy of Canada on military
applications of AI could help to guide its normative leadership:
Canada should be prepared to stake a claim in leading the world to a regulated use
of AI in all spheres of activity, including national defence and security. To do so,
Canada too needs to develop its own national policy on military applications of AI.
Such a policy could also help to guide its normative leadership. 254
The next activity that Canada should consider is the convening of military AI and IHL
workshops or conferences. Inviting researchers and specialists across the globe provides
the opportunity to take either current or future legal matters related to new militarized AI
systems into account more accurately. The outcome of hosting conferences can lead to
initiatives devised by researchers and specialists. These initiatives might be able to promote
compliance with IHL and create new legal norms on certain AWS and LAWS (to protect
civilians and human security), weapons that cannot be ignored based on their catastrophe
humanitarian impacts, threats, and challenges.
One of the examples of these initiatives is such as what has been done with cyber
operations in the Tallinn manual.255 The Tallinn Manuals have provided legal and policy
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experts with a valuable guide on how international law applies to cyber operations. Another
example can be the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare.
This Manual has provided legal advisors and military officers with an interpretation of
international law applicable to air and missile warfare operations.256 These manuals are not
hard law per se but have had important normative and practical influence contributing to
the awareness of IHL issues
Canada could dedicate a program on new military AI in universities to promote
compliance under international legal norms. This would give academics and specialists a
platform for information and idea sharing on regulating AWS, LAWS, including with
respect to IHL compliance. This idea can evolve Canadian policymaking. Canada, by
virtue of a rich history in transparent national and international measures and reputation in
education, can welcome more scholars, academics, researchers, scientists, legal experts,
and international organizations from all around the world to discuss the future of warfare,
militarized AI and humanitarian concerns.
Training militaries and civilians also should be a focus in the educational system.257 As
a result, in addition to understanding the rules from an academic standpoint, legal review
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of new AI weapon systems and enforcement of IHL rules on military activities can be
improved.
Moreover, clarifying grey zones in national legislation on emerging technologies, in
order to ensure that institutions and special authorities in charge of humanitarian issues are
aware of all requirements would be a practical step. Further, Canada should deploy military
lawyers abroad to teach others about new military AI systems and their operations to ensure
compliance with IHL in developing countries.
Canada can be open to taking more comprehensive perspectives at both international
and domestic levels on specific weapons with full functions (i.e. weapons without any
human control) that are unable to guarantee humanitarian legal norms when encountering
a new situation. When Canada in the Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy states its
position at UN discussions through a commitment to maintaining appropriate human
involvement in the use of military capabilities with a lethal force, it proves that it is
committed to IHL compliance. Canada has declared, in accordance with Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I, that it maintains the necessary element of appropriate human
involvement through conducting national legal reviews of new weapons, means, or
methods of warfare, to ensure that weapons systems are meeting Canada’s international
legal obligations in ensuring IHL compliance.
Crucially, if IHL rules are not revisited, the new means and methods of warfare cannot
be regulated under the current categories, as there is no definite meaning of “appropriate
control”. This is even true in individual states where they use the phrase “meaningful”
human intervention because the applicability of current law is no longer clarified.

thereof in their programmes of military … instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to
the entire population, in particular the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.”
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Therefore, Canada can play an active role by addressing the ambiguities adequately,
clarifying its explicit position on grey areas, proposing an interpretation of current legal
rules and new types of actions on new militarized AI.
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CONCLUSION
Artificial Intelligence will impact the future of warfare dramatically, with the potential
to change how military applications and decisions are or should be made on the battlefield.
New military AI technologies can have unpredictable applications, which can pose
significant challenges to the law. The advancement of technology will create new
challenges requiring greater action under applicable rules. There is no doubt that at the time
when the first IHL laws were passed, technology was in its infancy, but we can predict an
unsafe future of technology as it evolves. International Humanitarian law must evolve and
anticipate military technological advancement.
With respect to AI, the inadequate response to military AI might be due to globalization
and the competition between great powers that have prevented a fundamental shift towards
amending the rigid legal rules in this area. Yet, the international community faces
tremendous challenges as a result of the rapid development and use of new weapons and
warfare systems that indeed are already changing the nature of warfare. In light of this, it
is necessary to acknowledge that advanced military AI technologies have necessitated a
revision of IHL.
In attempting to categorize emerging militarized AI under current legal concepts, the
law needs to evolve to keep pace and new legal approaches need to be explored. There is
a need to ensure that the wheel of law and humanitarian legal principles covers gray and
unpredictable areas. Generally, there is no doubt about the applicability of IHL to new
weaponry and AI technological developments based on requirements Article 36 (new
weapons) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which imposes an
obligation on states to determine whether the employment of a new weapon, means, or
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method of warfare would be prohibited by IHL or any other relevant rules of international
law. But there is an ambiguity about whether new automated weapons, drones (remotecontrolled weapons systems), unmanned weapons, and other modern weaponry that are
already in use in armed conflicts, were created or will be developed in accordance with the
requirements of this article.
Evidently, when the use of new types of weapons systems in armed conflicts cannot be
properly prohibited or adequately regulated, it violates IHL regulations. While military AI
technologies advance with a capability to violate IHL rules, states have a responsibility to
ensure adherence to IHL based on Common Article 1 to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions. To ensure compliance with the obligation to respect IHL on the national
level, the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as competent military and
humanitarian organizations, shall use IHL-compliant pressure levers.
National organizations and other comparable bodies dedicated to IHL should
collaborate coherently to ensure the efficacy of IHL and the protection of legal rules in the
use of means and methods of warfare. The same is true on the international level, as states
must ensure that the IHL provisions and the principles of humanity are respected by other
State and non-State Parties while they are conducting military operations or deploying new
weapons systems. However, by entering Artificial Intelligence into the battlefield, it is not
clear how states will ensure respect in practice or what kind of specific steps need to be
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taken. Clearly, IHL rules must be applied to every violation caused by military technology
and any means or methods, but unfortunately, this has not always been the case.
As such, on an international level, the lack of legal clarity in international legal rules
and the lack of definitions gives rise to debates over the ambiguities of existing written
rules. As a result, the revision of IHL treaties and their legal rules is necessary to find more
consistency in the advanced world of technology in order to protect people who are not
participating in hostilities. In revisiting IHL rules, it is a given that treaties cannot be readily
changed, however, there is always the chance of re-examining, amending, and interpreting
existing rules in good faith to develop norms. Nevertheless, if it is not possible to revise
and amend the current humanitarian legal regulations, then a new complementing set of
regulations with the capability of clarifying the future path needs to be created.
Comprehensive revision and implementation of IHL rules require coordination and support
from all related entities towards universal acceptance (or near-consensus) on revisiting
existing or adopting new rules.
To fulfill the humanitarian requirements, and to take a civilian-centered approach in all
controversial debates while using advanced military AI technologies, a changing
technological world calls for new forms of action to be taken by states at the national and
international levels. In taking new forms of action and adopting new rules, states are bound
to respect IHL and the Martens Clause. For example, even if treaties do not cover AI
technologies, by applying other fundamental humanitarian provisions such as Martens
Clause, we ensure that military AI technology will not jeopardize the purposes of
humanitarian law.
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Additionally, states need to clarify military AI conduct under the principles of IHL, and
their flexibility in regulating novel rules. This is vital as international competition leads to
countries deploying militarized AI without sufficient attention to humanitarian
consequences and addressing weapons systems adequately. As a result, many states do not
have explicit restrictions, and they are not explaining transparently how they will mitigate
risks. Transparency in national and international law should remain a paramount factor.
All states should be flexible to implement international rules in their domestic
legislation - adopting practical measures to be compliant with IHL- and the national law
of each state can be considered as evidence of state practice for the purpose of developing
customary international law in this area. The development of domestic law in this field can
also further transparency and act as a confidence-building measure.
Therefore, to restrict military AI applications that violate IHL, states should take action
with respect to the primary proceedings on a national level to mitigate upcoming conflicts
and eradicate greater challenges. Due to the interaction between law and technology, it
seems likely that adopting and reinforcing non-binding disarmament norms and binding
regulations in a national legal system under IHL could be one of the priority steps to take.
By systematically integrating CIL and sources of soft law, states would be able to
strengthen their domestic legislation. Establishing new classifications containing
customized conditions for emerging military AI, in particular before humans are entirely
cut off from autonomous technology, can be one of the examples that need to be taken into
account on national and international levels.
Furthermore, creating an international regulatory organization to apply accountability
mechanisms can be an effective step in ensuring the comprehensive implementation of
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IHL. Such a body could develop accountability mechanisms. As a result, all states will
view these mechanisms as IHL-compliant pressure mechanisms.
The next step is that new means and methods of warfare before its development need
to be more regulated by adopting a specific international convention and protocols. If there
cannot be clear explanations of new military AI in AWS and LAWS, then it must be
regulated through applying multilateral approaches, perhaps under a new treaty on AI
technologies. In essence, the existing and new law would ultimately pave the way for more
flexible regulations. So far, states have not come to a conclusive Agreement (such as a
complete ban because these technologies are developing and there is no internationally
agreed definition of -or approach to- controversial weapons systems, namely AWS and
LAWS) regarding using AI in military conduct. Most importantly, with the tendency of
militaries to maintain a technological edge, it may cause domestic organizations to oppose
new rules that would clarify vague matters and apply new restrictions. There is a concern
that this opposition in taking a transparent status on militarized AI would result in a lack
of clarity when it comes to international discussions regarding AWS and LAWS.
Since primary legal rules are written in general terms, we cannot anticipate the
consequences of militarized AI. Due to inadequacies in the way technology advancement
has been covered in these legal rules, there is no consensus over certain details. As a
consequence, a consensus or negotiations between a large number of states on a new treaty
that can contain substantial provisions on new means and methods of AI warfare is a
practical step. In drafting or conceiving of the rules of this new treaty, we can benefit from
studying domestic and international law, such as legislation, manuals, state practices, and
customary international law, especially because AI technologies are developing faster than
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IHL This treaty can codify CIL. In national law, courts can apply the provisions of this
treaty where implemented. As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, the position of
international law within national law depends upon a state’s domestic legislation, and states
may enact domestic legislation taking different approaches to implement international law
such as treaty provisions.
This is the interrelationship between domestic and international law. Canada as a
dualist country has taken different approaches depending on the source of international
law. For example, international law treaties generally are not directly effective without
implementing legislation in Canada. By signing and ratifying all the major IHL
conventions including ratification of the GCs in 1965, and the APs in 1990, and specific
IHL treaties such as Ottawa Treaty, Canada is obligated to take appropriate steps in its
domestic law to implement provisions of these conventions. While on the contrary, the
U.S. has signed and ratified the four GCs in 1955 and Protocol III in 2007, and it has yet
to ratify and become a State Party to AP I and AP II. The U.S. has not signed the Ottawa
Treaty and is not a party to this IHL specific IHL treaty. As such, in addition to the formal
adoption of a new treaty by the process of ratification or accession, there is a need of
implementing domestic compliance measures, such as legislation, regulatory and practical
measures so the provisions of a treaty can be fully effective.
In taking practical measures, Canada is a clear example of steady compliance. Beyond
signing treaties, Canada has so far taken practical measures such as the adoption of the
Joint Doctrine Manual Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels.
National military manuals govern military operations by establishing the guidelines
according to which commanders can conduct operations in compliance with IHL. Canada’s
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military manuals indicate respect for IHL and binding obligations not only upon the
Government or the Canadian Armed Forces but also upon every individual. The U.S., like
Canada, has adopted manuals to facilitate the dissemination of IHL, also to contribute to
the awareness of issues relevant to IHL and its rules applicable in armed conflicts.
Although manuals can help create or develop state practice and can provide related
information for implementing IHL, it can be argued that the detail of all IHL rules and
treaties cannot be captured in military manuals.
Another strong point in the national policy of Canada and the U.S. is a necessity in the
legal review of weapons and weapon systems to ensure compliance with all applicable
domestic law, international law, and other international obligations.
Although the call for a ban on the development of LAWS has been put forward by
some, 258 I recommend that Canada, given its history of leadership in peace and
disarmament, especially on landmines, through the Ottawa process, take steps to regulate
emerging AWS and LAWS adequately. Through this way, Canada not only could more
adequately clarify its position, but also encourages other developed and developing
countries to implement transparent policies on banning or regulating emerging
technologies as well. A Canadian perspective at either a national or international level
indicates that Canada has generally might be more accurate applied transparency in its
policy. The key point is that it can set an example for other countries if it appears as an
active state in regulating grey areas, particularly for countries with ambiguous

258

See Lieutenant-Commander Daniel Rice, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: A Clear and Present
Danger (Canadian Forces College, 2019), online (pdf): <
https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/405/305/rice.pdf>.

103

commitments and those that have not ratified the major IHL conventions like the Ottawa
convention.
Canada can respond to legal and ethical concerns by not only adopting but developing
a procedure for dealing with vague and grey areas. To that end, both domestic and
international initiatives will be required. Such initiatives might apply an effective
mechanism for monitoring compliance as well. For example, although there are some
countries, including the US, that have not signed the Ottawa Convention, the treaty is
broadly considered a major success in terms of reducing the number of landmines and
stigmatizing their use. A similar process such as this Convention can be proposed and
followed through new initiatives and developing normative guidelines to ensure that the
U.S. remains treaty compliant. Given the advancement of military AI technologies,
normative guidelines and initiatives would create legal obligation acting as a pressure-lever
in taking steps along the lines of the Ottawa Convention. As complementary guidelines,
these initiatives might create explicit legal obligations so that non-signatory states do not
engage in unethical behavior by claiming that some provisions of this Convention are
unclear.
In developing a procedure, a fundamental revision of legal rules may play a pivotal role
to ensure that legal rules serve not only the interests of states but also the interests of
humanity. As long as Canada starts implementing these kinds of measures by “looking
beyond IHL for a thorough examination of the legal framework applicable to new means
and methods of warfare,”259 even in the face of opposition, it can develop more cohesive
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policies on the new military use of AI towards advancing legal norms and covering the
challenges of modern warfare posed by artificial intelligence.
On a national level, Canada was the first country to adopt a somewhat transparent AI
strategy. Following transparency, Canada could move toward addressing various AI
implications, in particular, legal and ethical implications through its national perspective
as a thought leader.
Through its international perspective, by addressing the controversial subjects, areas of
concern, and ambiguities on appropriate forums such as CCW fora, Canada would be an
active thought leader that can contribute to global stability. Nonetheless, Canada should
provide adequate clarification regarding its position on military AI ambiguities, especially
fully autonomous weapons systems. Canada needs to define appropriate human
involvement, or state to what extent human involvement seems necessary. This is true in
the U.S. as well. DoD policy states commanders and operators should be able to exercise
“appropriate” levels of human judgment when using autonomous and semi-autonomous
weapons systems.260 Choosing such legally ambiguous words cannot clarify to what extent
it might be performed by a human or a weapon system.
To conclude, the best model can be offered by Canada for developing countries, if it
can sufficiently address the controversial debates on LAWS. By promoting norms in the
area, and encouraging the development of an independent regulatory organization, Canada
would be more capable to ensure such involvement and guarantee accountability
mechanisms to assist in the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for crimes
against humanity and war crimes using AI combat systems. In order to influence the rules
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and practices of military AI technologies, Canada could apply special and additional
regulations to various applications of AI in military systems, before or after deployment,
taking into account the associated risks, without distinguishing any specific sectors.
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